Nonmarket Autonomy: Combining Private and Collective Approaches to Corporate Political Activity by Minto, Amy
 
 
NONMARKET AUTONOMY: COMBINING PRIVATE AND COLLECTIVE 
APPROACHES TO CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
by 
AMY M. MINTO 
A DISSERTATION 
Presented to the Department of Management 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
June 2016
ii 
 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
Student: Amy M. Minto 
Title: Nonmarket Autonomy: Combining Private and Collective Approaches to Corporate 
Political Activity 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Management by: 
Anne Parmigiani Chair 
Michael V. Russo Core Member 
Alan D. Meyer Core Member 
Christopher J. Ellis Institutional Representative 
and 
 
Scott L. Pratt  Dean of the Graduate School 
    
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
Degree awarded June 2016 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2016 Amy M. Minto  
iv 
 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Amy M. Minto 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Management 
 
June 2016 
 
Title: Nonmarket Autonomy: Combining Private and Collective Approaches to Corporate 
Political Activity 
 
 
By pursuing private and collective political action in the nonmarket environment, 
businesses attempt to influence public policy that shapes their operating environment. 
This dissertation considers how a firm’s market-based experience and its accumulation of 
political resources affect how the firm combines private and collective political tactics. 
Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) I investigate how a firm’s 
alliance experience, political resources and prior collective political experience influence 
the autonomy of its Corporate Political Activity (CPA). I use fixed effects GLS 
regression with clustered standard errors to test my model on a panel of 21,329 firm/year 
observations of 2,779 U.S. property casualty insurance companies over the ten-year 
period between 2005 and 2014. I find support for the influence of state-level political 
resources, equity alliances, and the interaction of prior collective CPA experience with 
regulatory complexity and learning capacity on autonomy.  My findings contribute to the 
growing literature connecting market and non-market strategies by linking collaboration 
in the political arena to the related market activity of alliance experience. Findings also 
contribute to our understanding of how participation in a collective provides 
opportunities for learning, and reveals that taking advantage of this opportunity depends 
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on a firm’s learning capacity and the complexity of its regulatory environment. These 
findings add insight to the literatures on CPA, inter-organizational learning, collective 
action and trade associations. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation explores how market and nonmarket experience and resources 
affect firm action in the nonmarket arena. More specifically, the research will consider 
how a firm’s market experience and its accumulation of political resources affect how the 
firm combines private and collective political tactics. Drawing on the resource-based 
view of the firm (RBV) I investigate how a firm’s alliance experience, political resources, 
and prior collective political experience influence the autonomy of its Corporate Political 
Activity (CPA). 
Businesses exist in an environment characterized by increasing interdependence 
with government. Governments, in the form of legislative bodies and regulatory agencies, 
set and enforce policies that affect how businesses operate and what products and 
services they produce and sell in the market. Governments in turn rely on firms for 
critical information about industries and influence with key constituencies. A firm’s 
corporate political strategy and tactics have implications not only for its ability to create 
value from government policy, but also for its competitive position among other firms in 
the market (Capron & Chatain, 2008). Nonmarket strategy scholars argue that firms 
should integrate their market and nonmarket strategies (Baron, 1995), and yet we know 
far too little about whether and how a firm’s market strategy influences its political action 
and other important nonmarket activities.  
The nonmarket arena includes the social, political, and legal forces that shape 
interactions between a firm and broader society (Baron, 1995). Nonmarket strategy 
reflects a firm’s view of its role in the nonmarket environment. Although firms can 
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respond to their nonmarket environment with passive acceptance, nonmarket strategy 
scholars are generally more interested in the strategic objectives firms develop to realize 
long-term success and competitive advantage through interactions in the nonmarket 
arena. Nonmarket strategy is composed of underlying strategies related to specific parts 
of the nonmarket arena, such as political strategy.  
Political strategy is a firm’s purposive view on how to engage with government to 
create lasting competitive success. I describe a firm’s political environment as 
encompassing the political bodies that generate and enforce the government regulations 
that apply to a firm and the systems of law and regulation in which a firm enacts political 
tactics in pursuit of political strategies (Hillman & Hit, 1999). In this dissertation, I 
consider a range of proactive and reactive political actions including researching 
regulatory requirements, making regulatory filings, monitoring legislative and judicial 
changes, lobbying politicians directly or through grassroots networks, providing 
testimony to committees, drafting legislation, and making financial contributions to 
political actors  
My dissertation contributes to an emerging niche of strategy-based research on 
corporate political activity. I position my work in particular alignment with two recent 
works (Jia, 2014; Jia & Mayer, 2016). In an empirical paper, Jia (2014) identified 
complementarity between collective and private political actions. In a theoretical paper, 
Jia and Mayer (2016) explored complementarity between market based strategy and 
political activity. 
A key contribution of my dissertation is my representation of autonomy of 
political actions as a continuum. Researchers initially modeled firms’ decisions to engage 
3 
 
in political activity privately or collectively as a dichotomous choice, suggesting that the 
two modes of action represent substitutes for each other. Jia (2014) introduced the 
alternative view that the modes represent complements, adding a potential third strategic 
choice of firms to pursue both. I push theory further by proposing that firms select a level 
of autonomy of CPA that reflects their use of private action relative to their total 
engagement in private and collective modes of political action. As public policy and 
regulation become increasingly important, I argue that firms will pursue political 
strategies through various levels of autonomy, and that purely collective and purely 
private approaches will be atypical. The data I analyze supports my claim; of the 
observed 21,329 firm/years when firms engaged in CPA, 66% of the observations reveal 
firms combining both collective and private approaches to CPA. This illustration of the 
varying levels of autonomy of CPA helps demonstrate that we need to know more about 
how firms configure their political actions, when they collaborate, and when they go it 
alone in order to better understand how firms shape public policy.  
A second major contribution of my dissertation is integrating autonomy of 
political action with exploration of the connection between market and non-market 
capabilities. In recent theoretical work, Jia and Mayer (2016) propose one such 
connection, linking whether firms sell to business or consumers (market orientation) to 
the political tactics they employ. I build from these works as a foundation as I test 
whether firms’ strategic attitudes toward collaboration in the marketplace (alliance 
activity) affect the degree of autonomy with which they pursue their political actions.  
Drawing on theory from RBV, I argue that heterogeneity in firms’ political 
strategies and tactics is a function of the heterogeneous resources and capabilities 
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possessed by a firm (Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Political resources are those valuable, 
rare, and difficult to imitate resources that give firms a competitive advantage when 
interacting with government, and help firms achieve their political strategies. Political 
capabilities constitute firms’ “ability to know when and how to use particular political 
tactics to achieve a specific political outcome” (Jia & Mayer, 2016: 7).  
Despite the frequent adoption of RBV terminology to define and describe political 
strategy (e.g., political resources and political capabilities), little work has actually 
addressed whether and how these resources and capabilities generate value. After all, just 
about any company can hire a lobbyist or join a trade association, so how can those be 
considered strategic resources specific to the firm (Bonardi, 2011)? In response, this 
dissertation argues two points. First, consistent with Jia and Mayer (2016), I argue that 
when firms integrate their political and market strategies to deploy political actions 
related to their strategically important market-based capabilities, the political capabilities 
they build may be more difficult to imitate. Second, I argue that some firms are endowed 
with innate characteristics that privilege firms with rare, valuable, and difficult-to-imitate 
political resources. Third, I argue that access to political resources and capabilities of 
trade associations, although not particularly rare, can provide firms important 
opportunities to develop proprietary resources and capabilities on which to build strategic 
advantage. 
Observable heterogeneity of firms’ political resources helps reinforce the view 
that political resources can constitute the basis for strategic value. Firms clearly engage in 
different combinations of political tactics and focus on different political resources. The 
fact that not all firms acquire the same ones implies that political resources’ values are 
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uncertain, that there are not enough political resources to go around (rarity), that their 
value may be contingent on other resources, or that they are path-dependent in 
development. This dissertation explores different sources of political capabilities and 
considers how these origins may affect a firm’s ability to derive strategic value from 
them. If, for example, a firm has strong alliance capabilities – a type of capability much 
researched for its strategic potential (Kale & Singh, 1999) – will it be better at advancing 
its political goals through membership in a trade association? I argue that some political 
resources may not be inherently valuable, rare, or difficult to imitate, but may offer 
strategic value when combined in certain discretionary combinations. Knowing what 
combinations and how to use them would constitute a valuable political capability for a 
firm.  
In light of recent economic crises, the United States government has taken a 
renewed interest in the regulation of business. At the same time, recent judicial decisions 
such as the Citizens United ruling (Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 2010) 
have focused increased emphasis on business’s potential political role. As the political 
and regulatory landscape of business shifts, managers need to better integrate nonmarket 
strategies into their overall organizational strategy formulation. Even industries whose 
firms have not previously been particularly interested in their political environment will 
need to become more aware of public policy’s potential influence. Yet, research on 
political strategy is still in its developmental stages. To increase our understanding, we 
may first need to explore industries that already experience regulatory scrutiny. We can 
learn a lot from firms in highly regulated industries, for whom the political environment 
has long been highly salient. This dissertation is set in the United States insurance 
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industry; insurance has a long history of regulation, providing an ideal setting to 
investigate how regulated firms configure the political actions that comprise their 
political strategies and evaluate if their actions and strategies in the market arena 
influence how they pursue political action. This setting enables the third key contribution 
of my study, to provide insight from firms that have well-developed understanding of the 
importance of policy due to their mature, highly regulated environment.  
The rest of this dissertation continues as follows. First, in Chapter II, I review the 
relevant literature from which I draw to build and test my theory. Chapter III contains the 
theoretical development and statement of testable hypotheses. Chapter IV provides a 
description of the research method with which I test my theory, the data I gathered, and 
the variables I employed in my model. Chapter V presents the results of my empirical 
testing. Finally, Chapter VI concludes the dissertation and addresses implications of my 
findings.  
The theoretical basis for this dissertation is synthetic in nature, drawing from and 
combining multiple streams of literature. In my literature review, I provide a curated 
review of each stream. First, I provide a review of the CPA literature, discussing its 
origins, key relationships, and findings. Next, I review the competitive action literature 
and its findings related to CPA and mode of political action. Last, I provide a brief review 
of the RBV and capabilities literature and its implications for understanding strategic 
advantage, with particular attention to the literature on alliance capabilities. 
In Chapter III, I draw on the reviewed literature to evaluate how firms develop the 
political capabilities necessary that support successfully political action through private 
as well as collective means. I propose that firms may either draw on their related market-
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based experience, build on their existing political resources, or learn first through 
engaging in collective political action to develop PCPA capabilities. I offer hypotheses 
related to each source, and include moderating variables to test for the potentially 
contingent nature of their influence. 
In Chapter IV, I address my choice to set the study in the U.S. property/casualty 
insurance industry, describe the sources from which I gather data, explain the operational 
measures of my variables, and report the statistical framework I use to test my model. 
Insurance offers a promising context for a single industry study because of the long 
history of regulation (a condition research has shown important for the relevance of 
political strategy (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008)). I gather data from multiple sources 
to compile a large panel data set of 21,329 firm/year observations over a period of ten 
years. My model includes one dependent variable, three main explanatory variables, two 
moderating variables, and carefully selected controls. 
I estimate my model using fixed effects linear regression. In Chapter V I explain 
the different models I considered and how the nature of the data, issues of specification, 
and identification led me to select the fixed effects linear model. Hypothesis testing 
yields support for some but not all of my hypotheses. I present the results, summarize the 
findings, and discuss the explanations for my findings and non-findings.  
Lastly, Chapter VI offers a concise summary of this dissertation. I highlight the 
most important information from each preceding chapter and present implications for 
theory, management practice, and public policy. The purpose of Chapter VI is to provide 
an extended abstract and executive summary of the dissertation.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 - INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation explores the conditions under which firms deploy varying 
degrees of autonomy with respect to their political actions. To this end, I draw on existing 
theory on CPA and collective action and the literature on resources and capabilities. In 
this chapter, I first review and synthesize the CPA literature, briefly summarizing key 
articles that integrate market and political strategies. Second, I review theory on 
collective action and briefly assess its application to firm behavior in market and 
nonmarket environments. Lastly, I summarize the main aspects of the RBV and the 
capabilities literature, briefly review alliance capabilities, and discuss current work on 
integrating RBV into CPA through identification of political resources and capabilities. 
Table 1 provides readers with definitions for key concepts and terminology used in this 
literature review. I incorporated this table for the benefit of with readers less familiar with 
the CPA literature. 
2.2 - CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY  
Overview of Political Strategy 
 Since the 1980s, scholars in economics, political science, and management and 
organizations have gradually built a body of theory on how and why business firms 
engage in political activity. Preceded by the work of Epstein (1969), the interrelationship 
between business and government has faced increasing importance since the gradual 
increase in the regulation of business since the 1970s (Mitnick, 1980). As businesses 
become more aware of opportunities posed by the political arena, strategy scholars have  
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TABLE 1 
Definitions of Key Terms 
Key Term Definition References 
Corporate 
Political 
Activity (CPA) 
The accumulated actions taken by a firm to shape, or 
in response to, its political and regulatory 
environment. 
Hillman, Keim 
& Schuler, 2004 
Collective 
CPA (CCPA) 
Political activity pursued through collaboration with 
one or more independent firms; most commonly 
organized through an association. 
Hillman & Hitt, 
1999; Hillman, 
2003 
Private CPA 
(PCPA) 
Political activity pursued independently by a firm or 
corporate group. Also known as individual political 
activity (Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  Jia, 2014 
Corporate 
Political 
Strategy 
A firm's purposive approach on how to engage with 
its regulatory and political environment to create 
lasting competitive success. 
Baysinger, 
Keim, & 
Zeithaml, 1985 
Political 
Tactics 
The specific actions firms pursue within their 
political environment to advance their political 
strategy.  
Hillman & Hitt, 
1999  
Private Interest 
Goals or objectives that benefit solely the focal firm 
or the incremental advantage to the firm if it benefits 
more than firms that share the interest. Olson, 1965 
Shared Interest 
Goals or objectives that benefit a group of more than 
two independent firms. Also known as collective 
interest (Olson, 1965). n/a 
Political 
Capabilities 
A firm's ability to effectively identify political goals 
and identify and employ the appropriate political 
tactics to deploy to pursue political goals; may be 
composed of underlying political resources and 
underlying capabilities. 
Jia & Mayer, 
2016 
Political 
Resources 
The assets and attributes of a firm that have the 
potential to provide competitive advantage in the 
political arena. 
Barney, 1991; 
Lawton, 
McGuire, & 
Rajwani, 2012;  
Alliance 
Capabilities 
Rare and difficult to imitate ability to manage 
alliance relationships to generate competitive 
success 
Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Kale & 
Singh, 2007 
Regulatory 
Intensity 
A construct employed in existing CPA research 
primarily to address differences in levels of 
regulation between industries and/or regulatory 
bodies, may be described as regulatory stringency 
Holburn & 
Vanden Bergh, 
2008  
Regulatory 
Complexity 
The difference in quantity and scope of regulation 
experienced by firms both within and between 
industries. n/a 
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tried to develop a comprehensive understanding of corporate political strategy. Although 
firms may take proactive or reactive approaches to public policy, the strategy field is 
most interested in when firms proactively engage in political actions in pursuit of better 
overall performance. In this dissertation, I define political strategy as a firm’s purposive 
view of how to engage government to create lasting success. 
 In the dominant theoretical framework on political strategy, Hillman and Hitt 
(1999) modeled political strategy formulation as a decision making process involving 
three decision points. The first decision involves the firm’s choice of a transactional or 
relational approach to action. Of key interest to this dissertation, the second decision 
involves a firm’s choice to pursue political action individually or collectively, which 
yields a distinction between collective corporate political activity (CCPA) and private 
corporate political activity (PCPA) (Jia, 2014). The third decision involves choosing 
between three generic strategies: information strategy, financial incentive strategy, and 
constituency-building strategy. Choice of generic strategy leads to a series of different 
possible political tactics. Political strategies describe the general formula for how firms 
intend to achieve their political goals, whereas political tactics describe particular actions 
a firm may take to support its strategy (Baysinger et al., 1985; Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  
Objectives of CPA  
Prior research has conceptualized the objective of CPA in a variety of ways. 
Ultimately, the goal of CPA is to enhance market strategies and create value for a firm 
(Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer 2002). More specifically, firms apply CPA to create value 
by influencing the political process so external structure better matches internal 
objectives (Baysinger, 1984). Within this broader frame, CPA is viewed either as an 
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investment of the firm in uncertain future gains or agency on the part of individuals at the 
expense of the firm. Finally, in the face of highly uncertain payoffs, CPA may be a form 
of strong signaling aimed at preventing high regulatory costs (Gordon & Hafer, 2005). 
The investment perspective of CPA suggests that firms incur the costs of 
engaging in political activity as an investment in shaping their political environment to 
create value for the firm and its shareholders. Early CPA scholars argued that firms invest 
in political actions that manage, defend, or maintain their political domain (Baysinger, 
1984). Firms deploy domain management activities to pursue private gain at others’ 
expense. Through domain defense, firms attempt to manage the legitimacy of the broad 
purpose of the firm and to counter threats to organizational goals and purposes. Domain 
maintenance is similar to defense of broad industry level goals, but firms apply it to 
maintain managerial autonomy and the legitimacy of the methods used to pursue strategy 
(Baysinger, 1984). Domain management seems to reflect a firm’s private interests, where 
domain defense and maintenance reflect the interest a firm holds in common with other 
members of its industry.  
Firs direct investments in CPA to various different targets of political action. 
Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2004) note that firms might seek to influence regulatory 
agencies charged with enforcing policy, the legislator or executive who sets the policy, or 
both. They further argue that the nature of a given political environment will vary 
depending on which institution is pivotal in helping a focal firm achieve its objectives. 
Their arguments derive from positive political theory, which views the discretion of 
regulatory agencies to oversee firms as subject to potential responses their actions may 
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trigger from legislators and managers. Firms may attempt to pursue their goals by 
approaching various political and administrative parties. 
Gordon and Hafer (2005) proposed that firms invest in political activities to signal 
regulators that enforcing regulation on the firm would cost more than enforcing 
regulation on other firms, and to encourage regulators to focus their limited resources on 
other regulatory targets. Investing in these signals, firms seek to shift the regulatory 
burden to (presumably) competitor firms. If successful, this action stands to benefit the 
firm both directly by reducing regulatory costs and indirectly by increasing competitors’ 
costs. Empirical support for this perspective consists of significant negative effects of 
corporate political spending on the intensity of regulation. 
The agency perspective of CPA suggests that political spending reflects an agency 
problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) wherein managers allocate resources to political 
pursuits in order to achieve personal rather than organizational objectives. Prior research 
identifies several objectives of CPA that, when acted on by management, constitute an 
agency problem. In a classic manifestation of the agency problem, managers may support 
political initiatives that strengthen power of management relative to shareholders, or that 
generate short-term performance gains at the expense of long-term financial successes 
(Mathur & Singh, 2011). Political spending may constitute perquisite consumption by 
managers (Aggarwal, Meschke, & Wang, 2012; Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo, & Snyder, 
2003). Examples of consumption motives of CPA include support of personal political 
ideologies not related to managers’ economic duties to the firm (Mathur & Singh, 2011), 
“being part of the Washington establishment” (Ansolabhere et al., 2003: 127), and 
building political connections to advance political career aspirations (Mathur & Singh, 
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2011). In general, scholars have associated these motivations with excessive managerial 
power and entrenchment and viewed them as detrimental to shareholder value because 
they divert resources from potentially productive uses.  
Results of empirical analyses of the agency perspective of CPA have been 
inconsistent. In a study of direct corporate contributions between 1991 and 2004, 
Aggarwal and colleagues (2012) find political spending is negatively associated with 
future abnormal returns, supporting the view that CPA presents an agency problem. 
Moreover, they find that firms that make (relatively) direct campaign contributions 
possess other characteristics traditionally associated with agency problems. On the other 
hand, in a study of corporate lobbying data between 1998 and 2003, Mathur and Singh 
(2011) find that large firms with powerful and entrenched managers actually engage in 
less lobbying than do managers at large firms with stronger corporate governance. In a 
subsequent study of the same data set, Mathur, Singh, Thompson & Nejadmalayeri 
(2013) find that firms with powerful and entrenched managers are more likely to lobby, 
but among those firms that engage in lobbying, greater entrenchment and weaker 
corporate governance are associated with lower lobbying intensity. As is common in 
CPA literature, synthesizing these findings is difficult because different authors study 
different types of CPA (e.g., lobbying vs. contributions). Although Mathur and Singh 
(2011) and Aggarwal et al. (2012) both test the effect of corporate governance, they 
operationalize this key variable in different ways.  
Another perspective is that CPA may both serve individual interests of managers 
and create value for shareholders (Mathur et al., 2013). In this way, CPA may actually 
align the interests of management and shareholders and thus reduce agency concerns. 
14 
 
Empirically testing this supposition, however, may be particularly challenging. Farrell, 
Hersch, and Netter (2001) observed that executives with larger shares in their companies 
contribute more to PACs. Hadani (2007) found that publicly traded, founder-managed 
firms incurred higher total political expenditures than did other firms. Noting that 
founding family managers generally have a long-term presence in the firm (like 
entrenched managers), that founding family firms are less susceptible to agency 
problems, and that founding managers’ interests aligned with the interests of the firm, 
Hadani’s (2007) study provides indirect support of the alignment perspective.  
Types of CPA 
 Among the three general political strategies (information provision, financial 
incentives, and constituency building) proposed by Hillman and Hitt (1999), the CPA 
literature primarily focuses empirical study on lobbying and campaign contributions as 
specific political tactics underlying information provision and financial incentives 
strategies pursued to influence policy. In the following section, in order to inform 
understanding of a review of these studies, I provide background information on how 
firms in the United States may enact CPA through lobbying or financial incentives. 
 Lobbying is the process by which an interest group (such as a firm) attempts to 
influence the behavior of a political officeholder (Baron, 2006) by providing information 
or exerting pressure (Getz, 1997). Scholars employing the political exchange perspective 
of CPA have argued that firms possess unique expertise, knowledge, and information that 
would be prohibitively expensive for politicians to develop on their own. This view 
suggests that politicians rely on firms and activist groups to provide information through 
lobbying in order to make well-informed decisions. Although descriptions of lobbying 
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often focus on the exchange or contact between a lobbyist and a political actor, scholars 
have theorized lobbying to include many activities that occur outside the exchange, 
including information gathering and mobilizing constituent networks (Kollman, 1998). 
Lobbying may be unilateral, preemptive, or counteractive (Baron, 2006). 
 Scholars view lobbying as the most instrumental form of CPA (Hansen, Mitchell 
& Drope, 2005), and argue that studying lobbying rather than political contributions 
provides greater insight into CPA (Baysinger & Keim, 1985). On the other hand, 
lobbying is less transparent than campaign contributions (Baron, 2006). Firms may 
engage in lobbying through several modes including individually or collectively (Hillman 
& Hitt, 1999; De Figueiredo & Tiller, 2001), through in-house or contracted lobbyists, or 
by mobilizing constituent networks (Kollman, 1998). 
In the United States, campaign finance laws heavily regulate political 
contributions made directly by corporations. Laws prohibit direct monetary contributions 
from corporations to political candidates, so monetary incentives in CPA are generally 
provided through PACs. A firm may sponsor one or more PAC and pay the overhead 
costs associated with forming and administering the PAC. Contributions to the PAC are 
solicited from firm employees and key shareholders, and limits exist to how much any 
individual can contribute to the PAC. Regulations also limit the amount of money a PAC 
can contribute to a given candidate. Firms can use PACs individually (through a 
corporate PAC) or collectively (through a PAC sponsored by an association with which 
the firm is affiliated). 
Firms may also provide financial incentives in less direct or less legitimate means. 
Such incentives may range from promises of future employment or employment for 
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family members (Hillman & Hitt, 1999) to soft-money contributions to so-called 527 
organizations and/or to political parties for party development. Recently, the Supreme 
Court decision on Citizens United v. the Federal Elections Commission (2010) changed 
the landscape of campaign finance and raised renewed interest in political scholarship. 
The ruling reversed prior law, allowing corporations greater freedom to sway public 
opinion on political issues by paying for advertising in support of political candidates and 
issues. Changing public sentiment has been traditionally viewed as a form of 
constituency building (Lord, 2000), but the Citizens United ruling may blur the lines 
between constituency building and financial incentives as firms can take on costly 
campaign advertising expenses on behalf of candidates. Although academically 
interesting and politically charged, advocacy advertising and illicit incentives are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. 
CPA scholars often interpret financial contributions as attempts by firms to 
influence the composition of government in favor of politicians who are more receptive 
to their issues (Baron, 2006) or as a means for firms to effectively buy access to political 
actors (Schuler et al., 2002) in order to lobby them. Ansolabehere and coauthors (2002) 
find empirical support for the latter view in the form of significant relationship links 
between PACs and lobbying activity. However, Chin, Bond, and Geva (2000) argue that 
PACs may not be as useful in gaining access as popularly believed. Their study of 
scheduling by legislative staff revealed that being associated with a PAC provided greater 
access only to those politicians who rely heavily on PACs for campaign funds.  
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Antecedents of CPA 
Prior research attempts to identify the determinants of firm CPA. Summarizing 
this literature is challenging due to the different ways CPA is measured and the inherently 
multi-level nature of the conditions surrounding firms’ CPA decisions. Several excellent 
reviews exist that describe the complex landscape of this literature (e.g., Hillman et al., 
2004; Lawton et al., 2013). In the following section I briefly identify the major 
institutional and industry-level antecedents that affect firm CPA, then summarize the 
firm-level determinants that are more salient to this dissertation.  
Institutional level. The political institutions that govern organizations strongly 
determine the ability and propensity of firms to engage in CPA (North, 1999). The 
receptivity of the court system to challenges to regulation (De Figueiredo & De 
Figueiredo, 2004) impact firms’ likelihood of engaging in CPA. Prior CPA research (e.g., 
Hillman & Hitt, 1999) emphasizes the effect of corporatist versus pluralist political 
systems, arguing that corporatists systems that focus on ex-ante compromise make CPA 
more likely (Sawant, 2012). In addition to political institutions, economic institutions 
affect firm CPA through the influence of currency rates (Destler, Odell, & Elliot, 1987) 
and wage rates (Rehbein & Schuler, 1997). Jia (2014) found that strong market-
supporting institutional environments made firms in emerging economies less likely to 
engage in private political action, though these results were not robust to addition of other 
variables. 
Industry level. Building on Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action, prior 
research frequently tests the effect of industry concentration on firm CPA (De Figueiredo 
& Kim, 2004; Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Schuler, 1999). The results of these tests have 
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been largely inconsistent perhaps due to inconsistent and inaccurate measurement of the 
construct (Hansen et al., 2005). Industry characteristics such as unionization and 
employment rates (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991) also influence firm CPA. An industry’s 
exposure to tariff and regulation (Rehbein & Schuler, 1999) can make a firm more or less 
likely to seek protection through political means. Regulatory intensity of an industry also 
influences firm CPA (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008). 
Firm level. Prior research has identified and tested several antecedents that vary 
at the firm level, although scholars been mischaracterized some firm facts as industry or 
institutional level factors. Firm size is perhaps the most frequently identified factor. 
Scholars measure firm size primarily as revenue (Brasher & Lowery, 2006; Drope & 
Hansen, 2006; Shuler, 2002) or number of employees (Masters & Baysinger, 1984; 
Rehbein & Schuler, 1999). Researchers argue that larger firms face greater exposure to 
policy and are more attractive to policy makers, and are therefore more likely to attempt 
to shape policies through political means. Relatedly, researchers note that differential 
resources influence firm CPA: wealthier (De Figueiredo & De Figueiredo, 2004) and 
more profitable (Masters & Baysinger, 1985) firms are more likely to possess slack 
resources (Lenway & Rehbein 1991; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999), which they can devote 
to nonmarket activities such as CPA. On the other hand, resource slack might not 
influence CPA because, increasingly, political action represents a critical and non-
discretionary function of firms. Other scholars note that the relationship between 
financial performance and political activity may be somewhat endogenous. 
Corporate governance mechanisms such as ownership structure (Brasher & 
Lowery, 2006) and long-term compensation (Ozer & Alakent, 2012) reduce CPA, 
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reflecting the perspective of CPA as managerial perquisite in the agency theory tradition. 
Although scholars generally believe that managers’ personal interests influence firm CPA 
(Cook & Barry, 1995), Burris (2001) finds that contribution patterns of firms and their 
top managers differ, suggesting that the effect of managerial orientation is limited. 
Integrated strategy research (Baron, 1995) links firm CPA to its market-based strategies. 
Diversified firms are more likely to engage in CPA, particularly relational CPA (Brasher 
& Lowery, 2006; Hansen & Mitchell, 2001; Kim, 2008). Foreign ownership affects CPA 
(Getz, 1996; Hansen & Mitchell, 2001), although this firm-varying factor may more 
properly reflect the additional set of institutional conditions foreign-owned firms 
experience from their home country. Recent theoretical work suggests that firms’ market-
based capabilities influence CPA (Jia & Mayer, 2016), although this link has yet to be 
empirically tested.  
Issue level. Not all political issues affect firms equally. Scholars recognize that 
issue-level factors influence firms’ propensity to engage in CPA and the tactics and 
modes of action they choose. In general, scholars assume that firms are more likely to 
lobby on issues that are particularly salient to them. De Figueiredo & Tiller (2004) find 
that firms are more likely to lobby directly than through a hired external lobbyist when 
the issues are highly firm-specific and risk of information leakage is high, and more 
likely to use outside lobbyists when topics are less sensitive or require knowledge 
common in the industry. De Figueiredo & Tiller (2001) find that associations undertake a 
greater portion of total contacts on issues that reflect shared interests, and a lesser portion 
if firms have to share proprietary information with the trade association. The ability of an 
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association to exclude firms from benefiting from the association’s lobbying efforts 
affects the mode of lobbying, but the direction of the effect depends on firm size.  
Broadly stated, factors at multiple levels influence firm CPA by either making 
CPA more important or less costly. Factors that affect the perceived importance of CPA 
as a firm function include regulatory intensity, economic conditions, firm size, and 
dependence on government. Factors that make CPA less costly to a particular firm 
include differential resources, asset specificity, and political resources such as having a 
DC office or a large employee base in key electoral districts. Following this logic, I note 
that firms that perceive a high need for CPA are likely to organize in such a way as to 
make CPA less costly (Hedberg, Bystrom, & Starbuck, 1976). Firms for whom CPA is 
less costly may also perceive greater importance of CPA than other firms may (Grant, 
1996). Adding to the puzzle, firm size, resources, and government dependence affect both 
the necessity of and the costs of CPA. 
Outcomes of CPA  
Scholars testing the effectiveness of CPA have generally focused one of two 
outcomes. The first group of scholars explores the relationship between CPA and firm 
financial performance. The second group studies the link between corporate political 
strategies and beneficial policy outcomes, the means by which they theorize firms 
achieve financial benefits from CPA. 
Research on financial outcomes provides inconsistent findings on the value of 
CPA. Faccio (2006) finds that firms derive stock price benefit when firm officers or large 
shareholders enter politics, but not when politicians join boards. Hadani and Schuler 
(2013) find that corporate political spending positively affects the market value of 
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regulated firms, but has a slightly negative effect on a firm’s return on assets. Hersch, 
Netter, and Pope (2008) find no significant relationship between political spending and 
capital market performance (Tobin’s Q). In meta-analysis, Lux, Crook, & Woehr (2011) 
find a significant association between CPA and financial performance.  
Alternately, several scholars have attempted to link CPA to policy outcomes. On 
one hand, this approach is beneficial because it avoids endogeneity issues associated with 
financial performance and illuminates the means by which CPA supposedly creates 
financial benefits. As Chen, Parsely, and Yang (2015) states, “any preferential treatment 
the firm receives should impact the firm’s financial performance” (2015: 2-3). On the 
other hand, policy outcome studies potentially contain substantial noise because firms 
often invest political spending in many concurrent policy issues, and these studies may 
not capture CPA’s effectiveness in fending off negative policy outcomes that never see 
light. 
Research on the link between CPA and policy outcomes has been slightly more 
consistent than research on financial outcomes, although the results were still weak. 
Ansolabehere et al. (2003) study the connection between political contributions and 
legislator voting outcomes; of the 36 papers the authors surveyed, they found 10 that 
showed significance, and 4 that did not find significant results. The rest of the papers 
analyzed found only partial support for their hypotheses (p. 113). Strattmann (2002) 
found a positive association between contributions and policy votes. De Figueiredo and 
Edwards (2007) found a positive relationship between the financial contributions to state 
legislators and a favorable effect on regulated prices in the telecommunications industry. 
Bonardi, Holborn, and Vanden Bergh (2006) found that opposition from citizen activism 
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significantly weakened the relationship between CPA and policy outcomes, but that prior 
experience on the part of the firm strengthened the relationship.  
Gordon and Hafer (2005) suggest that the weak empirical connections between 
political activity and policy outcomes may be because the activity does not actually 
attempt to influence legislation, but rather serve as a show of force to those who will 
enforce the regulation that firms engaged in CPA are willing to fight regulation in the 
political arena. Another plausible reason for the lack of consistent results is that 
contributions buy access to policy makers, not votes. Alternately, the benefit of 
contributions may be difficult to identify because organizational contributions account for 
such a small percentage of total campaign funds or because contributions support the 
election of preferred candidates rather than attempt to influence the voting of seated 
members. 
Lord (2000) investigated perceived effectiveness of different forms of CPA. His 
survey of key congressional staff and corporate regulatory affairs officers shows that 
lobbying directly by firm executives and constituency building activities are more 
effective in influencing legislative outcomes than either professional lobbying or 
advocacy advertising and contributions through PACs. In addition, corporate respondents 
viewed CPA as significantly more effective than did congressional staff. Lord’s findings 
suggest that corporations may overestimate the value of political investment, which might 
partially explain the lack of consistent findings of a link between CPA and financial or 
policy outcomes. 
Studies of the outcomes of CPA are methodologically challenging. Both financial 
performance and policy are likely endogenous to several of the critical variables that 
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influence firm CPA. Interpretations of early research findings in the area are vulnerable 
to strong concerns about model mis-specification. Although researchers have recently 
taken strides to control for endogeneity, effective instruments are difficult to identify, and 
present challenges in interpreting the size of the effect. Instead of tackling outcomes, this 
dissertation explores firms’ strategic choices of CPA involvement and the market-based 
and political resources and experiences that support their political action.  
Integrating Political and Market Strategy 
Within the community of CPA scholars, a niche of strategy researchers explore 
the inter-relationship between firms’ political and market strategies. Looking beyond how 
political outcomes shape market opportunities, this research embraces the concept of 
integrated strategy as proposed in the literature on nonmarket strategy (Baron, 1995). In a 
relatively early work in this literature, Capron and Chatain (2008) adopt an RBV lens to 
argue that firms can take action in the political arena to weaken the value of competitors’ 
market resources. Funk and Hirschman (2015) argue that when firms take market actions 
based on their interpretations of vague regulations or novel actions that are difficult to 
categorize in the existing regulatory framework, they influence public policy. In this way, 
market actions may constitute political activity. Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2014) 
investigate firms’ campaign contributions in advance of merger and acquisition events to 
find that firms precipitated their market actions with increased political activity, likely in 
an attempt to ease the regulatory approval process. In a theoretical piece, Jia and Mayer 
(2016) draw on RBV to explore how capabilities that support firms’ marketing strategy 
influence their choice of political tactics.  
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2.3 - COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The full literature on collective action, ranging from political science and 
economics, through sociology and strategy, to management and organizations, is too 
expansive to review in a single dissertation. In this section, I provide a brief review of the 
literature on collective action, focusing on areas from which I later draw theory to build 
propositions. I begin with a discussion of Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action and 
describe the nature of public goods. Next, I summarize market and nonmarket forms of 
collectives, and discuss the tensions that occur between competitive and collective 
strategies. I then provide a more detailed review of the compact literature on trade 
associations in management research, and conclude with a discussion of antecedents of 
collective action as they relate to political activity. 
The Collective Action Problem 
Early work on collective action (Olson, 1965) focused more on understanding if 
collective action could occur than how such action would occur. This research drew 
heavily on the assumption that collectives pursued public goods, and argued that the 
conflict between individual incentives and collective interest created a collective action 
problem resulting in an insufficient provision of public goods.  
The classical statement of the collective action problem is that individual actors 
(firms, in this context) have insufficient incentive to invest resources in public good 
because they will be free to consume the public good whether they invested in its creation 
or not. Individual firms are thus incentivized to free-ride (McMillan, 1979), which 
introduces the heart of the collective action problem: If no firm(s) bear an incentive to 
invest in the public good, how will it be pursued? Olson’s (1965) treatise on the problem 
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illustrates that when firms in an industry maximize their own profits, profits for the 
industry as a whole are lower. Competition among firms that seek to maximize their own 
profits drives down prices. Although this is the same principle on which the free market 
is assumed to prevent undue rents from accruing to industries, Olson (1965) and others 
argue that competition reduces the ability of groups to work together to achieve their 
common goals.  
Olson (1965) describes the conditions under which the collective action problem 
will occur. These include individual actors (or firms) who seek to maximize their 
individual wellbeing, share an interest in a non-excludable public good, and together 
make up a group large enough that the contributions of an individual member will go 
unnoticed (Olson, 1965). Olson argued that only under certain conditions would groups 
successfully organize to provide a common good. He defined three broad classes of 
groups (privileged, intermediate, and latent) based on size and member characteristics. A 
privileged group is “a group such that each of its members, or at least some one of them, 
has an incentive to see the collective good is provided, even if he has to bear the full 
burden of providing it himself” (p. 50). An intermediate group is “a group in which no 
single member gets a share of the benefit sufficient to give him an incentive to provide 
the good himself, but which does not have so many members that no one member will 
notice whether any other member is or is not helping to provide the collective good” (p. 
50). Finally, Olson defines a latent group as “a very large group… distinguished by the 
fact, that if one member does or does not help provide the collective good, no other 
member will be significantly affected, and therefore none has any reason to react” (p. 50). 
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A latent group can mobilize to provide a common good only if it offers a selective 
incentive sufficient to garner individual contribution.  
One key point about Olson’s (1965) treatment of collective action is that he 
equated the boundaries of a group as defined by shared interest. An industry is one such 
example, because presumably all members share an interest in the production and 
distribution of the product or service that defines the industry. Recognizing that firms 
share interests with entities on many levels other than just industry, including subsector, 
geographic region (e.g., clusters) or social ideology, may be important to understanding 
how firms engage in CCPA. 
The presence of rivalry and excludability distinguishes between private and public 
goods. Public goods non-rival when consumption of a pure public good by one or more 
parties will not reduce the amount of that good available to others (Samuelson, 1954). 
Many mixed goods (Holtermann, 1972) fall between these polar extremes (Weisbrod, 
1964), varying largely on the degree to which they are excludable (Margolis, 1955; 
Musgrave, 1964). Goods are excludable if some mechanism can prevent some individuals 
from consuming them (subject to monetary exchange). Even when otherwise private by 
exclusion or pricing, some goods maintain an element of publicness through an “option to 
consume in the future” (Weisbrod, 1964: 473). 
Several scholars have identified and defined specific categories of mixed goods 
including joint goods (Oakland, 1972) and club goods (Buchanan, 1965). Joint goods are 
a subset of imperfect public goods, where the consumption by one individual (though 
rival) benefits at least one other individual. Oakland (1969) summarizes his point, stating 
that joint goods share some of the features of both private and public goods. Club goods 
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are a type of imperfectly public goods that are excludable and partially rivalrous in 
consumption (Cornes & Sandler, 1986, 1994). A club is “a voluntary collective that 
derives mutual benefits from sharing an impure public good, subject to congestion and 
crowding” (Cornes & Sandler, 1994: 382). The collective or group defines the boundary 
of the limited set of individuals who may consume the good (its excludability). The 
notion of crowding reflects Margolis’s (1955) concept of capacity of availability such 
that a limit may exist to the amount of the good available or an incremental cost to 
provide more of a good past a certain point (rivalrous after a given point of consumption).  
Scholars acknowledge that different individuals may hold different preferences 
for public goods. Samuelson (1954) assumes that different individuals may assign 
different value to (derive different utility from) different goods (both private and 
collective). Cornes and Sandler (1994) note that it is quite plausible that some individuals 
may place a positive value on a public good while others place a negative value on the 
same good. Largely, however, scholars in this stream of research focus on modeling 
individual utility curves to test the robustness of earlier work that models the optimal 
provision of public goods. Scholars should focus additional attention on what the 
differential value of public goods means for their development and consumption.  
In contrast to neoclassical theory, Malkin and Wildavsky (1991) argue that the 
distinction between public and private goods is largely socially constructed and 
endogenous rather than arising from inherent properties of the good. They argue that the 
more relevant distinction is whether institutions provide the goods publicly or privately. 
Viewing public goods this way, and recognizing the politically-contested nature of social 
construction makes public goods those goods that provide benefit to a sufficiently large 
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group of individuals (or to a sufficiently influential individual or group), who socially 
construct them in a way that we traditionally recognize as being public goods (e.g., 
without excludability and/or rivalry in consumption). Malkin and Wildavsky (1991) 
argue that the distinction between public and private goods “should be abandoned” 
(1991: 355). Whether they abandon this view or not, scholars should recognize that 
classification of a good as public is most usefully viewed as an ex-post characteristic of 
the good, and not an ex-ante consideration in its development.  
Although largely developed in the context of public finance and political 
economy, management scholars have adopted the concept of public goods have been 
invoked in various ways. Considering a firm’s institutional environment, Barnett (2006) 
describes industry characteristics as a public good based on their non-rival application to 
all firms in an industry. For similar reasons, public policy is generally viewed as a public 
good. Olson (1965) argues that in nonmarket situations (such as policy setting), goods to 
be provided are public goods by nature of their non-excludability and non-rival nature. 
Tullock (1971) comes closest to tying public policy to a public good, arguing that a 
judge’s decision contributes to the major public good that we call law enforcement. By 
extension, public policy and regulation can be viewed as aspects of law enforcement, a 
joint good (Oakland, 1972) that is consumed by the object of the regulation, the 
consumption of which creates positive benefits for other individuals (presumably 
consumers). Hansen et al. (2005) argued that government “selectively enforces a regime 
of regulation,” (2005: 152) which increases the excludability of the good and takes it 
further from being a pure public good. At best, contrary to their general treatment as 
simple public goods, public policy and regulation are mixed goods that share 
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characteristics with both joint goods (Oakland, 1969) and club goods (Buchanan, 1965), 
depending on the nature of the policy or regulation.  
Trade Associations 
Trade associations are the dominant form of collective action in the nonmarket 
arena (Barnett, 2013). Management researchers are beginning to address these important 
organizations, but we still do not have much theory, and we have even less empirical 
evidence about them (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). Researchers argue that 
associations exist in order to manage shared problems such as the reputation commons 
(King & Lenox, 2000; Tucker, 2008) and act as mechanisms for information exchange 
(Kirby, 1988). Because of the high uncertainty in firms’ shared environment, small and 
medium firms in particular join associations to learn about policy issues (Wilts & Meyer, 
2005) and form perspective on the nature of shared problems (Barnett, 2013). 
Firms join associations to share information about nonmarket issues (Barnett, 
2013; Kirby, 1988) and to gain access to particular services (May, McHugh, & Taylor, 
1998; Wilts & Meyer, 2005) and resources that transcend organizational boundaries 
(Collins & Roper, 2005). Similarly, firms join associations to access knowledge and 
expertise (Lawton et al., 2013) and to develop individual capabilities (Collins & Roper, 
2005). Empirically, despite a trend in Europe toward trade associations focusing on 
service delivery rather than the firm/government interface (May et al., 1998), political 
concerns are the main driving force of trade associations, with managers reporting they 
are primarily motivated to join associations in order to shape public policy (Wilts & 
Meyer, 2005). Trade associations generate influence (Lawton et al., 2013) and 
reputational trust with political actors (Tucker, 2008). Schaefer and Kerrigan (2008) 
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argue that associations are more likely to form in the presence of external competition, 
state intervention, member complementarities, and/or high social cohesion. They echo 
Olson (1965) in arguing that a large pool of potential members makes the formation of an 
association less likely and add that association is also less likely if members possess 
unequal resources. 
Trade associations are more likely to seek to improve industry conditions in the 
face of a powerful political and regulatory environment (Reveley & Ville, 2010) and 
public attention (Schaefer & Kerrigan, 2008). Trade association lobbying is influenced by 
industry factors such as competition, concentration, size, and government procurement 
(Drope & Mitchell, 2009) and association-level factors such as greater association 
income (May et al., 2005) and associative capacity (Reveley & Ville, 2010). 
Although often perceived as existing to provide voice to shared interests of 
members and to improve industry conditions (Reveley & Ville, 2010), the extent to 
which trade associations may actually give voice to a mix of shared and private interests 
is unclear. Researchers have acknowledged that private interests may vary within a 
collective (Olson, 1965). A recent empirical study found that trade association actions 
better reflect the interest of the largest firms, rather than those of the entire industry 
(Barnett, 2013). Additional research can fill the gap in our knowledge of how tensions 
between private and collective interests shape association goals and actions.  
When do Firms Act Collectively? 
Scholars have theorized several factors at the firm, collective, institutional, and 
issue levels that encourage firms to act collectively. At the firm level, scholars suggest 
that firm size and slack resources make firms less likely to act collectively (Hillman & 
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Hitt, 1999; Olson, 1965). Organizations will act collectively when doing so provides an 
opportunity to reinforce inter-organizational and interpersonal relationships and when 
resources needed to complete the task are located in more than one firm, are relatively 
immobile, and are costly to recreate within a single organization (Peteraf, 1993).  
Institutional and issue-specific factors together will likely influence a firm’s 
decision to act collectively. Firms are more likely to take political action collectively in 
institutional environments with pluralist political systems (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), 
reflective of a political philosophy “private associations… and cooperatives, should have 
a larger constitutional role in society” (Olson, 1965: 111). In environments with lower 
regulatory intensity, firms may act collectively to develop private regulatory systems to 
manage their collective reputation and forestall costly government regulation (King & 
Lenox, 2000).  
Finally, smaller groups are more likely to act collectively due to lower 
coordination costs and because they can better mobilize selective social incentives to 
prevent shirking (Olson, 1965). Scholars have tested whether industry concentration 
predicts collective action, but the studies have yielded mixed results (e.g., De Figueiredo 
& Tiller, 2001; Hansen et al., 2005; Ozer & Lee, 2009). 
Just as some conditions make collective action more likely, so also do some 
conditions make firms more likely to act individually. Collective action may limit a 
firm’s strategic flexibility and consume firm resources (Bresser, 1988; Lifton, 1989). It 
may also expose firm resources to risk of appropriation (Lavie, 2007).  
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Tension between Collective and Private Interests 
The tendency when analyzing collective action is to focus on the shared interests 
that underlie the collective, but a firm’s choice to act in the interest of the collective 
depends on both its shared interests and its private strategies. Collective strategies seek to 
improve firm performance by increasing the rents available to a group of firms, whereas 
competitive strategies seek to improve firm performance by capturing a larger share of 
available rents relative to other firms in the group (Demsetz, 1973). These strategies may 
conflict with one another (Bresser, 1988) and pose dynamic tension (Barnett, 2006) as 
firms choose how best to allocate resources between them. Firms can maintain a capacity 
to alternate between collective and competitive strategies (Bresser & Harl, 1986), attempt 
to balance them (Barnett, 2006), or combine them (Bresser, 1988).  
Collective Action in CPA 
Although scholars almost unilaterally invoke Olson’s (1965) theory of collective 
action as the dominant view on CCPA, they characterize collective action differently than 
Olson. In the CCPA literature, scholars view collective action as actions organized and 
undertaken by a group of firms or an association. Olson (1965), on the other hand, 
viewed collective action as any action that generated a public good, regardless of whether 
undertaken privately or through a collective. From Olson’s perspective, a large firm in a 
privileged group engaging in political action in pursuit of industry improvement would 
be as engaging in collective action by Olson (1965), but private action by CPA 
researchers. This distinction has likely contributed to the inconsistent empirical findings 
on collective action theory in CPA. 
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Few published papers have empirically tested when firms are likely to adopt 
individual or collective strategies. In a study of issues lobbied before the FCC, De 
Figueiredo and Tiller (2001) find that collective action theory correctly predicts the 
behavior of large firms, but not small firms. In a study of firm preference between private 
and collective use of PACs, Ozer and Lee (2009) find that firms use private PACs less in 
highly concentrated industries and more when they rely heavily on government contracts. 
Lastly, in a study of political action in China’s emerging markets, Jia (2014) finds that 
entrepreneurs who belong to an association are more likely to seek political office, but 
that a prior political role or partial government ownership of the firm moderates this 
effect. This dissertation aligns closely with Jia’s (2014) article. Both study private and 
collective CPA, and consider contingent variables that moderate a firm’s use of collective 
and/or private action. Primary differences include context, theoretical foundation, and the 
level of collective action considered. Jia (2014) investigates the political action of 
entrepreneurs in an emerging economy, focuses on the complementarity and 
substitutability CCPA and PCPA offer, and studies participation in a large business 
association whose members are individuals and whose shared interests are very broad 
(akin to a Chamber of Commerce). In contrast, this dissertation explores CCPA as a 
source of learning that allows firms to develop the political capabilities necessary to 
engage in PCPA by studying differences in firm behavior within a single industry with a 
long history of regulation. It is my hope that this dissertation can complement findings of 
previous empirical work in expanding our understanding of, and empirical commitment 
to, firms’ choice among and between PCPA and CCPA.  
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2.4 - THE RESOURCE BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM 
This dissertation explores how firms develop political capabilities that allow them 
to choose among collective and private political tactics. I draw a theoretical foundation 
for my arguments from the capabilities literature, which in turn draws heavily from RBV 
in order to explain how the characteristics of resources that underlie a firm’s capabilities 
affect its value potential. The development aspect of my capabilities story invokes 
dynamism of a firm’s capabilities, which scholars address in the literature on dynamic 
capabilities and the capabilities lifecycle. In this section, I provide a brief overview of the 
key concepts and assumptions of RBV, the capabilities literature, and the theory of 
dynamic capabilities. I then briefly introduce the literature on market-based alliance 
capabilities. 
Resource Heterogeneity  
RBV arose from the central argument that heterogeneity of resources can explain 
and predict differences in performance between otherwise similar firms (Penrose, 1959). 
A resource is a firm attribute (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) or an asset or factor of 
production under a firm’s control that contributes to the firm’s effectiveness and 
efficiency (Barney, 1991) by enhancing value creation and/or capture (Leiblein, 2011). 
Resources afford these benefits when they possess desirable characteristics of value, 
rarity, imitability and substitutability (Mellewigt & Nothnagel, 2008). Although 
sometimes viewed as factors to acquire or trade, early work on resources emphasized 
heterogeneous resources endowed to firms due to their initial founding or chance events 
(Barney, 1991; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). In order for acquired resources to provide 
strategic value, their benefits must be uncertain or variable, such as when they depend on 
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matching with complementary resources. Resources can afford persistent strategic value 
if they possess characteristics that act as isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1987).  
Capabilities  
Whereas resources are assets or characteristics of a firm, capabilities are a firm’s 
ability to make use of its resources through action. An organizational capability is defined 
as “a high-level routine (or collection of routines) that, together with its implementing 
input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision options for 
producing significant outputs of a particular type” (Winter, 2000: 983). A simpler 
definition is capability as “the capacity of a firm to perform a particular activity in a 
reliable and at least minimally satisfactory manner” (Helfat & Winter, 2011: 1244). The 
critical aspects that define capabilities are their purpose (Dosi et al., 2000; Winter, 2003), 
their function as performance or coordination of a task (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), and their 
reliable repeatability (Helfat & Winter, 2011).  
Heterogeneity among capabilities arises from aspects of the conditions in which a 
capability’s purpose is realized (founding), developed, maintained, and potentially 
transformed. These stages comprise a capability lifecycle (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). 
Heterogeneity due to special or rare resources that underlie capabilities arises during the 
developmental stage. Transformation of capabilities beyond their basic development 
occurs through dynamic capabilities.  
 Dynamic capabilities are a type of higher-order capabilities that reflect a firm’s 
ability to adapt its resources and capabilities in anticipation of – or response to – changes 
in the environment. Research on dynamic capabilities emphasizes that resource allocation 
policies, organization structure, and managerial decision making determine how firms 
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alter their capabilities (Leiblein, 2011). Dynamic capabilities address a “firm’s ability to 
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies” (Teece, 1997: 516). 
Firms develop dynamic capabilities through the processes of knowledge accumulation, 
articulation and codification (Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
Alliance Capabilities 
As alliances have become an important feature of the market landscape, 
researchers have shown particular interest in the theory of alliance capabilities. Building 
on the concept that critical resources may span firm boundaries (Dyer & Singh, 1998), 
alliance capabilities researchers relax the assumption that strategic resources must be 
under the control of a firm in order for the firm to derive strategic benefits from them. 
Instead, alliance capabilities literature argues that firms can collaborate with other firms, 
embedding strategic resources in interfirm routines and processes. The routines and 
processes form the basis of alliance capabilities. 
Alliance management capabilities are those skills and knowledge that enable 
firms to manage alliances successfully to create relational rents (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Kale & Singh, 2007) from alliance portfolios (Hoffmann, 2007) or individual alliances. 
Alliance management capabilities develop through the higher-order dynamic capability 
of alliance learning processes that that involve articulation, codification, sharing and 
internalization of alliance know-how (Kale & Singh, 2007). 
Researchers identify several specific skills they argue comprise alliance 
capabilities. These skills include partner selection and establishing firm-level alliance 
monitoring mechanisms (Hoffmann, 2007). Other skills include addressing partner 
interdependence with the right coordination device, sharing information between firms, 
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and connecting with partners to develop interfirm bonds (Schreiner, Kale, & Corsten, 
2009). Taken together, these skills enhance alliance success. 
Political Resources and Capabilities in CPA Research 
RBV offers a promising framework for understanding differences in political 
strategies between firms. Although CPA scholars frequently invoke the language of 
resources and capabilities, CPA research has not fully integrated the principles of RBV 
and capabilities research into its theories (Jia & Mayer, 2016). In this section, I review 
the specific political resources and capabilities CPA researchers have identified, and 
address their fit within the broader RBV and capabilities framework.  
Political Resources. Scholars have identified special political resources and 
capabilities to explain differences in firm CPA (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Political 
resources are defined as “assets and skills utilized in the political arena” (Dahan, 2005: 
43), and consist of both organizational and relational resources (Lawton et al., 2012). 
Specific political resources CPA researchers identify include access to policymakers, 
status, reputation, and legitimacy (Baron, 1995; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Epstein, 
1969). Other political resources include privileged information and expertise, wealth, and 
time (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994) and relationships with pivotal political actors (Henisz 
& Delios, 2004; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2004), and political knowledge (Bonardi, 
2014).  
 Common operational measures of political resources include the presence or size 
of a Washington, DC-based office (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991) or political consultants 
(Schuler, 2000). Firms can acquire these resources by activating political connections, or 
develop the resources as routines through prior CPA experience (Masters & Baysinger, 
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1984). One critique of resource-emphasizing CPA research is that it fails to address how 
the value potential of political resources is determined (e.g., through value, rarity, 
imitability, and substitutability conditions), whether political resources are protected by 
isolating mechanisms, and the extent they arise from innate endowments of firms. 
Political Capabilities. Political capabilities are a firm’s ability to effectively 
identify and employ the appropriate political actions to achieve political objectives (Jia & 
Mayer, 2016). This definition highlights the purpose and function as action aspects that 
Helfat and Winter (2011) stress are critical to the concept of capabilities. Holburn & 
Zelner (2010) defined political capabilities as a firm’s ability to deploy and leverage 
political resources on an ongoing basis, highlighting the critical repeatability of 
capabilities. Researchers adopt government contracts as a proxy measure of both political 
capabilities (Rehbein & Schuler, 1999) and home-country institutional constraints 
(Holburn & Zelner, 2010) CPA. Recently, Jia and Mayer (2016) argue that political 
capabilities may relate to and draw on a firm’s market-based capabilities. They theorize 
that firm market orientation influences choice among general strategies (at the third 
decision point in Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) model of political strategy formulation). This 
dissertation also seeks to connect political and market capabilities. I theorize that alliance 
capabilities will influence firms’ choices at the second decision node, between private 
and collective action. I further recognize that capabilities develop and change over time 
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2003) by evaluating how political capabilities develop within firms. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
 The preceding literature review highlights the principal theoretical constructs and 
findings of the literatures on CPA, collective action theory, alliance capabilities and 
political resources and capabilities. Two distinct themes link these literatures. First, the 
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theme of collaboration link collective action theory, alliance capabilities research, and 
CPA literature in the areas of modes of CPA action and the antecedents and outcomes of 
CPA. The second theme of political action unites the literature on resources and 
capabilities with the CPA and collective action literatures through the concept of political 
capabilities. 
 This dissertation contributes to management strategy and organizational theory by 
illuminating the connections between the above literatures and combining them to inform 
theory on firms’ use of private and collective approaches to CPA. In the following 
section, I draw on the theories reviewed above to ground the development of hypotheses 
that predict the level of autonomy with which firms will pursue CPA. Because I ground 
my dissertation in these literatures, my dissertation findings will contribute insight on 
how each theory’s constructs impact autonomy of CPA.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
The following chapter draws from and combines the reviewed literature to 
develop hypotheses that explore how market-based experience and heterogeneous 
political resources influence the autonomy of firms’ corporate political activity (CPA). I 
begin by introducing the construct of autonomy of CPA. I then build the theoretical logic 
that serves as the foundation of my hypotheses and I formally state five hypotheses. 
Three hypotheses predict that alliance experience, political resources and prior collective 
CPA (CCPA) experience influence autonomy of CPA, directly or through the 
(unobserved) mechanism of capabilities development. The remaining two hypotheses 
predict that regulatory complexity and capacity for learning moderate whether prior 
CCPA enables greater autonomy of actions.  
When selecting political actions, firms can choose to act privately, collectively, or 
through some combination of both. By investing in these actions, a firm determines the 
autonomy of its political actions. When engaging in private CPA (PCPA), a firm may 
engage directly with regulators, staffers, and politicians or can hire outside experts who 
take these actions on its behalf, reflecting a classic boundaries of the firm dilemma. CPA 
researchers almost unilaterally conceptualize CCPA as actions taken by or coordinated 
through trade associations of which a firm is a member. Firms can also act collectively 
through coordinating political actions in smaller informal groups, or by jointly hiring 
independent lobbyists to pursue their narrowly shared interest. Within the insurance 
industry, firms may employ other collective approaches to managing their regulatory 
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environment such as participating in rating bureaus and filing standardized policy forms 
generated by collective standards organizations. 
Historically, researchers have modeled firms’ decisions to engage in political 
activity privately or collectively as a dichotomous choice (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). And 
yet, just as we recognize that firms configure their CPA out of multiple tactics (Schuler et 
al., 2002), researchers are beginning to recognize that firms take part in CPA through 
some combination of both PCPA and CCPA. Over time, a firm will pursue multiple 
political actions either privately or collectively. I argue that when measured over time, 
the proportion of all CPA pursued privately represents a meaningful measure of the 
extent to which firms view their political environment as a potential source of strategic 
value. I introduce the construct of autonomy of CPA to reflect this relative emphasis on 
private action. 
The dichotomous choice between private and collective action best matches 
analyses of CPA performed at the issue level of analysis, as it reflects a firm’s mode 
choice for a particular issue. I argue that as strategy scholars we can better understand 
firm-level political strategies by evaluating a comparable firm-level construct that 
represents a firm’s approach to using private and collective modes of CPA across 
multiple political issues and actions. Recent CPA research has recognized that firms 
combine multiple political tactics (Schuler, Rehbein, & Keim, 2009) and that collective 
and private modes of action may act as complements rather than as substitutes for each 
other. Combining these two insights with applied knowledge of the domain, I argue a 
need exists to understand not just the choice firms make between modes of action, but 
how they combine modes across an ongoing series of political actions. A continuum is 
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preferable to a categorical private/collective/both approach because I am interested in 
ways that firms combine modes rather than simply whether or not they combine modes. I 
construct autonomy as a proportion because a proportion-based measure is conceptually 
intuitive when considering how much firms emphasize one of two similar choices.  
Because political capabilities reflect the ability of a firm to employ the 
appropriate political actions (Jia & Mayer, 2016), political capabilities themselves cannot 
directly predict a specific level of autonomy without full information on the issues at 
hand. To further my theory, I unpack political capabilities and identify categories of 
underlying capabilities that support collective (CCPA capabilities) and/or private (PCPA 
capabilities) CPA. I assume that the resources and capabilities that support CCPA are 
common; a firm with no existing political knowledge or experience need only join a trade 
association to pursue CCPA. In such a case, the trade association provides the specialized 
resources and capabilities (which will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section) to pursue action on its members’ behalf. In order to pursue PCPA, on the other 
hand, firms must possess some degree of political resources and PCPA capabilities. By 
extension, PCPA capabilities enable firms to choose between both CCPA and PCPA, 
leading to greater autonomy of CPA. 
Researchers have sometimes treated public policies as public goods on grounds 
that laws apply to everyone, although even early researchers recognize that policies can 
have asymmetric impact on firms (e.g., Olson, 1965). Public policies apply to firms at 
multiple levels. Some laws apply to all firms within an institutional sphere; others apply 
only to single industries or sectors. Still others may narrowly affect only firms that use 
certain factors of production and/or that produce specific goods or services. Governments 
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can use laws and regulations to incentivize behavior of a targeted group, as described in 
the literature on policy and innovation (e.g., Zhao & Ziedonis, 2012). Firms, in turn, can 
pursue not only policies from which they and their industry stand to benefit, but also 
policies that impair competitors’ positions by affecting the value of competitors’ 
resources (Capron & Chatain, 2008) and raising rivals’ costs by blocking the use of 
substitute resources (McWilliams, Van Fleet, & Cory, 2002). Incumbent firms with 
particularly efficient regulatory management and compliance routines may oppose 
regulatory changes that could reduce their costs if changing the system could take away 
their relative advantage over competitors.  
Realistically, firms can have dramatically different preferences for policies. 
Although some policies may affect all firms relatively symmetrically, other policies can 
privilege some firms and constrain others. Some firms may be better able to organize in 
to appropriate the benefits of public policies. Firms actively pursue political actions to 
create collective and private benefit as well as to pursue competitive agenda. Where 
policies have asymmetric impact on firms, we should anticipate the firms will have 
different interests in the policies and may take different approaches to their pursuit. In 
general, a greater interest in a policy may drive firms to pursue the policy through private 
rather than collective means. 
On the other hand, the natural inclination to lump together collective and private 
interests with their corresponding modes of action may obscure how firms use political 
action to create strategic advantage. Being attentive to the distinction between interest 
and action can also provide a fresh understanding of classic theories. For example, 
Olson’s (1965) privileged groups are able to overcome the free-rider problem principally 
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because one or more group members judge that they will gain sufficient benefit from 
pursuing the shared interest to justify shouldering the entirety of the cost (i.e., through 
private action). In this case, collective action is essentially synonymous with pursuit of 
shared interest, irrespective of mode of action taken.  
In general, CCPA offers greater efficiency and legitimacy than PCPA. Because a 
trade association pools member firm resources, CCPA makes political action less costly 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Policymakers likely view CCPA as more legitimate than PCPA 
because it purports to represent to wishes of a greater number of parties and should be 
less likely to impair competition. On the other hand, public policy interests may be more 
difficult to coordinate collectively, as members with differing preferences must work to 
develop consensus or compromise. If collective action is always more efficient and more 
effective, pursuing collective interests privately does not make sense. Similarly, if firms 
only pursue shared interest through collective action, firms must pursue their private 
interests privately, or by identifying competitors who share the interest with whom to 
collective action.  
We generally assume that CCPA pursued by trade associations reflects only those 
interests shared by the collective. Yet recent research finds that trade associations act in 
the interest of a small subset of firms in the industries they represent, rather than in the 
shared interests of the industries as a whole (Barnett, 2013). A firm that pursues its 
private interests collective is able to pass on some of the cost of pursuing their interests to 
other members of the collective; to the extent that firms can shape CCPA to reflect their 
private interests, they can pursue their private interests most efficiently through CCPA. 
Then again, few firms are likely to have the power to shape the collective agenda around 
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all their private interests. If the private interests are competitive in design, a firm may not 
want to show its hand by pursuing these interests collectively. Logically, firms must 
pursue at least some private interests privately. 
Despite the potential cost sharing and legitimacy collective action offers, I argue 
that CCPA is not always preferred, even for collective interests. If firms invest in political 
resources and build firm-specific capabilities, scale efficiencies may make pursuing both 
private and collective interests through a single PCPA channel the better alternative. Such 
combined pursuit is likely if the private interest(s) seems more legitimate when firms 
package them with a collective interest (potential legitimacy spillover) or if a firm’s 
investment in the political resources needed to pursue private interest(s) offers sufficient 
capacity to support collective interests at little or no additional cost. For example, a firm 
with internal lobbyists and support staff may have enough private interests justify 
bringing the function inside the firm, but not enough to utilize the full amount of staff 
time. In order to consider all the strategic opportunities present in the political landscape, 
we should assume that firms engage in political actions that pursue some combination of 
private and/or shared interests by engaging in some combination of private and/or 
collective action. 
3.1 MAIN EFFECT HYPOTHESES 
To pursue its political interests, a firm can draw on its political capabilities as well 
as its core competencies in the market (Jia & Mayer, 2016). In the rest of this chapter, I 
develop testable hypotheses that propose that the experiences and resources that underlie 
these capabilities will affect the overall autonomy of its CPA. First, I explore how a 
firm’s alliance experience may make it more efficient and effective at CCPA, resulting in 
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less autonomy of CPA. Next, I address that a firm may naturally possess valuable 
political resources that give it a relative advantage at PCPA, pushing it to greater 
autonomy of CPA. Third, I consider that trade associations provide not just a mechanism 
for pursuing CCPA, but also access to potentially appropriable political resources. A firm 
engaging in CCPA might choose to internalize these resources as the foundation of firm-
specific political capabilities that support increased PCPA. By providing access to 
valuable appropriable resources, investment in CCPA may enable PCPA, leading to 
greater autonomy of CPA over time. Finally, I address whether the relationship between 
prior CCPA and greater autonomy of CPA is contingent on the firm’s learning capacity 
and its level of regulatory complexity.  
Alliance Experience 
 Integrated strategy recognizes that market-based and nonmarket actions are highly 
interrelated (Baron, 1995). Scholars recognize that nonmarket actions such as political 
tactics influence market conditions, as when legislation and regulation influence what and 
how firms can produce and sell products and services. Similarly, market-based activities 
can influence the political arena, as when market failures trigger demand for increased 
regulation or industry protection. One the other hand, we know little about how 
knowledge and skills developed through operating in the market can be applied to 
nonmarket contexts – such as the political arena – in pursuit of favorable public policy 
and regulation. In particular, I discuss how a firm’s alliance capabilities, which involve 
successfully managing collaboration and cooperation with other firms in the market, can 
serve as a source of political capabilities that lead a firm to emphasize collective political 
tactics.  
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Basing CPA on a foundation of skills and experience gained in the competitive 
market may provide greater strategic advantage because “imitating a firm’s market 
capabilities and market resources is more difficult than simply gaining experience with a 
particular tactic” (Jia & Mayer, 2016: 10). By drawing on its market-relevant skills and 
experience, a firm may be capable of enacting a greater variety of political actions than if 
it depends on skills and experiences derived from the political arena alone. As Bonardi 
(2008) notes, aligning market-based and political competencies can create organizational 
efficiency as the relatedness between the activities decreases cost of development, 
allowing market and political actions to share rather than compete for resources. 
Specifically, I argue that firms that know how to coordinate alliances effectively in the 
market should also be better at coordinating political interests collectively than firms that 
lack this knowledge. The mechanism supporting this relationship is the ability of the 
knowledge and skills embedded in human resources such as knowledge of relational 
governance, and organizational routines to on to cross functional boundaries, as they 
inform strategic priorities and are passed on to others employees and divisions.  
Firms with strong alliance capabilities are skilled at building and managing 
relationships with collaborators, as alliances between competitors can be problematic 
(Park & Russo, 1996). Alliance capabilities arise from alliance experience, through which 
firms develop the skills and abilities that comprise alliance capabilities. Critical skills 
include developing rapport and other relational resources (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In order 
to identify opportunities for collaboration, firms must have strong search and evaluation 
capabilities. These capabilities allow firms to identify potential collaborators who have a 
shared interest in some possible outcome. They also help firms evaluate which potential 
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collaborators have complementary resources and capabilities that will help achieve the 
shared interest most effectively and efficiently. These skills would be particularly useful 
in developing collectives (such as trade associations) and for selecting what associations 
to join in collective action. Even in the case of an established collective, these skills 
would be useful in identifying and recruiting additional members. 
A primary risk in market collaboration is the risk of appropriation of valuable 
firm-specific assets. Firms with strong alliance capabilities are adept at collaborating in 
ways that leverage and build on their valuable resources and capabilities without 
exposing them to capture or imitation. CCPA likewise bears the risk of exposing a firm’s 
political and market-based capabilities to appropriation. A fundamental function of 
lobbying through trade associations is to pool and combine resources of its members. 
Although the associations' efforts may be as simple as pooling funds, associations may 
also draw on, and potentially expose, members’ valuable political resources such as 
access to and relationships with key politicians, technical information used in information 
provision, and other specialized knowledge. Firms with strong alliance capabilities can 
draw on their market-developed knowledge of how to collaborate effectively without 
exposing their most critical resources to appropriation. 
Alliances, even those with formal structures, contain dimensions of relational 
governance. Relational contracting (Macneil, 1977) uses social contracts to govern inter-
organizational relationships. Through alliance experience, the managers and staff 
responsible for a firm’s contracting, such as its legal department, learn how relational 
contracts can complement and to some extent supplement formal legal contracts (Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002). Even when a firm’s functional management of alliances is very 
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separate from its political affairs, knowledge of relational contracting can flow across the 
separation through the firm’s legal function, whose managers are very likely to be 
involved in developing political strategy and enacting CPA.  
In summary, alliances involve identifying complementary resources across firms, 
safeguarding firm resources against appropriation, and capturing private benefit from 
collaborative endeavors. Each of these skills plays a role in the effective management of 
collective political strategies. I argue that firms with strong alliance capabilities are likely 
to emphasize collective political actions, and pursue less private political action. As such, 
I propose: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater a firm’s market-based alliance experience, the 
less autonomous will be its overall CPA. 
Political Resources 
Firms may possess valuable political resources on which they can draw to build 
and support PCPA capabilities. Although the benefit of cost sharing generally makes 
CCPA a lower-cost alternative to PCPA, strong PCPA capabilities can make PCPA 
relatively more effective and efficient, reducing firm reliance on CCPA and making firms 
better able to pursue private modes when deemed appropriate. Even though the presence 
of PCPA capabilities does not fully predict choice of CCPA or PCPA for every action, 
firms with greater PCPA capabilities will generally have greater autonomy of CPA 
overall than firms with weak or no PCPA capabilities who may be more constrained to 
use of CCPA.  
Just as the RBV explains differences in market strategies based on the 
heterogeneity of firm resources and capabilities, differences in political strategies may 
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arise from heterogeneity of firms’ political resources and capabilities. Although much of 
this chapter focuses on the ways firms acquire political resources and capabilities, I 
recognize that some political resources may be inherent to a firm. In particular, some 
firms may possess organizational characteristics and relational assets that provide them 
with difficult to imitate resources such as privileged access and influence.  
Access to policymaker networks is an important political resource that serves as 
the foundation of many other political activities. Access is an intermediate political goal 
that must occur before firms can hope to achieve influence with policymakers and on 
policy outcomes. Firms can attempt to gain access to politicians through the campaign 
contributions of a company-organized PAC. They can also gain access through private 
unofficial networks and by leveraging political resources of the firm. These latter forms 
of access hold greater strategic potential, as they are more difficult to imitate. Research 
suggests that they are also more valuable; PAC funds only influence policymakers who 
rely heavily on PACs to fund their campaigns, and lobbying efforts of constituents have 
greater influence on policymakers (Lord, 2000). As an example, firms based in 
policymakers’ home states have greater access to and influence with policymakers 
because their business activities may generate economic benefits for constituents of that 
state.  
Political resources are embodied in firms’ employees, directors, and owners, 
especially when these persons are former politicians and/or friends and family members 
of active politicians. Firms owned by, or that employ, former policymakers may have 
valuable access to members of the former policymakers’ network of influential political 
relationships. Although these relationships may constitute conflicts of interest, politicians 
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whose close friends or family members own or work for a given firm may be naturally 
sympathetic and inclined toward the political interests of that firm. These informal 
political connections can provide improved access and, more importantly, greater 
influence with key policymakers, serving as a foundation on which a firm can build its 
political capabilities (Schuler, et al., 2002). Through supporting development of PCPA 
capabilities, political resources enable firms to engage in political activity privately, 
leading firms with greater political resources to have greater overall autonomy of CPA 
than firms whose weak political resources allow them less opportunity to act privately. 
Thus, I predict: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater a firm’s political resources, the more 
autonomous will be its overall CPA. 
Prior Experience with Collective Corporate Political Activity (CCPA). 
A firm can use CCPA both as a means of collectively engaging its regulatory 
environment and as opportunity to learn and develop the knowledge and capabilities to 
allow it to pursue CPA on its own. Firms gain direct experience by participating in 
collectively organized political activities. Participating in CCPA also provides a firm 
access to the collective’s knowledge and capabilities, which it may seek to replicate 
within its organization. Over time, learning from experience and internalizing externally 
housed resources can serve as the foundation of stronger PCPA capabilities that allow a 
firm to pursue both PCPA and CCPA, increasing overall autonomy of CPA.  
Capabilities develop through the dynamic capability of learning through 
experience (Teece, 2007; Teece & Pisano, 1994). Firms acquire knowledge and 
capabilities through experiential learning (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Argot, 2012). 
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Through engaging in a function, firms accumulate experience and develop operational 
routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Nonmarket capabilities such as political capabilities 
may be especially difficult to develop and imitate and learning by first participating in 
CCPA offers firms low initial costs.  
The primary means through which firms engage in CCPA is the trade association. 
Trade associations act as a nexus of boundary spanning capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998) 
that pool and combine member resources. They also act as storehouses of resources most 
efficiently organized and held within a single organization. Trade associations represent 
an efficient means of engaging in the political environment and gaining access to 
externally held political resources and capabilities. For this reason, many firms make 
their first forays into the political arena through trade associations. A firm can engage 
with an association both to manage its political environment collectively, to gain 
experience by directly engaging in political action coordinated by the association, and as 
a means of appropriating the collective’s political knowledge and resources.  
As part of an association, a firm gains direct experience of CPA through 
participating in legislative action, receptions, fundraisers, and meetings. For example, by 
participating in a coordinated legislative action day, sometimes called a hill day, a firm 
participates in and observes an association’s well developed lobbying routines. A firm’s 
representative can meet legislative staff and learn the processes through which interested 
parties can interact with legislators and their staff. Through participation and observation 
of the collective’s routines, firms can replicate them within their own organizations. By 
learning from these experiences, a firm can develop its own PCPA capabilities and 
proprietary political resources. 
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CCPA provides firms access to the externally held resources of the association. 
Although a firm may choose to leave resources stored within the association, it can also 
attempt to appropriate them through replication or capture. Trade associations possess 
large stores of specialized knowledge about the legal and regulatory environment in 
which members operate. Trade associations also possess extensive networks of access to 
policymakers and other political actors. A firm can internalize the association’s 
knowledge resources much more efficiently and affordably than it could build them on its 
own. A firm is more likely to internalize the resources if its regulatory environment is 
especially salient to management or if the firm has a general tendency toward learning 
and building firm knowledge and resources.  
Through prior experience of CCPA, firms have the opportunity to gain direct 
CPA experience and to replicate valuable political knowledge and resources. Important 
technical and political knowledge can be absorbed readily and at great cost savings. 
Firms can acquire other, less tangible resources such as routines and relationships by 
observing and participating in CCPA. In this way, trade associations may house learning 
routines that support learning at the firm level (Kahl, 2014). By learning from these 
experiences, a firm can develop its own PCPA capabilities and political resources, which 
enable it to pursue private as well as collective political actions. As described above, 
increased PCPA capabilities predict an increase in the overall autonomy of firms’ CPA. 
Thus, I predict: 
Hypothesis 3: The greater a firm’s prior experience with CPCA, the more 
autonomous will be its overall CPA. 
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3.2 MODERATING EFFECT HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 3 proposes a main effect of prior collective action on the autonomy of 
a firm’s political tactics. It argues that a firm can develop the PCPA capabilities needed 
to support private political action from experience participating in CCPA and through 
knowledge transfer of the collective’s externally held political resources. However, as 
mentioned above, a firm may also engage in CPA purely to address its regulatory 
environment through collective action, and may not be motivated to use CCPA as a 
means to develop PCPA capabilities. To generate the remaining two hypotheses, I discuss 
how aspects of inter-organizational knowledge transfer affect the likelihood that a firm 
will use CCPA as a means of building political capabilities within its organization.  
The core logic of Hypothesis 3 is one of inter-organizational learning and 
knowledge transfer. Easterbury-Smith, Lyles, and Tsang (2008) described inter-
organizational knowledge transfer as a function of the characteristics of the knowledge 
donor, the nature of the knowledge, and characteristics of the knowledge recipient. Many 
of the characteristics thought to impede knowledge transfer between firms are less likely 
to impair learning between a firm and an association of which it is a member. Kale and 
Anand (2006) noted that once a recipient firm has learned the knowledge available from 
the donor firm, it will no longer have a reason to collaborate and the relationship will 
erode. Unlike the situation Kale and Anand (2006) describe, I argue that because 
associations are both a potential source of knowledge acquisition and a means of 
coordinating CCPA, the association/firm relationship will not be characterized by the 
type of protections against appropriation that typify market alliances. Because the 
relationship between an association and a member firm is less likely to erode after 
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knowledge transfer takes place, associations are likely to be more willing to provide 
knowledge in a way the firms can easily learn. Turning to the characteristics of the firm 
as learner, I focus on how the firm’s capacity and motivation to learn makes knowledge 
transfer in the association/firm relationship more likely. 
Learning Capacity.  
 In the lead up to Hypothesis 3, I suggested that the means by which prior CCPA 
leads to greater autonomy of political action is through the knowledge and capabilities 
firms learn and develop by participating in CCPA. Both the RBV and the literature on 
alliance learning recognize that firms must have available learning capacity in order to 
organize and retain the knowledge and resources learned through CCPA.  
Learning capacity relates directly to the related concept of a firm’s learning 
capabilities. A firm’s learning capabilities reflects the ability to assimilate and imitate 
knowledge (Kim, 1998). Learning capacity may reveal a firm’s dynamic capabilities 
because it reflects a firm’s ability to pursue strategically oriented organizational change 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). A firm’s capacity to use knowledge gained through 
participation in CCPA to pursue greater autonomy of CPA depends on its ability to find, 
assimilate, and translate political actions learned through the collective into PCPA 
capabilities that support private political actions.  
Learning capacity is akin to absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), a 
theoretical construct linked to research and development that has many variants and is 
often used to describe firm learning from the external environment (Lane & Lubatnik, 
2008; Zahra & George, 2002). Absorptive capacity generally relates to technical 
knowledge and market-based activities, and has a recursive relationship with 
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organizational learning (Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006). I adopt learning capacity as a 
parallel concept to absorptive capacity, differentiating primarily to reflect the non-
technical and nonmarket domain through which learning capacity affects the 
development of political knowledge. I argue that learning capacity underpins the dynamic 
capability of learning that enhances firm political capabilities.  
A firm with greater learning capacity will be more likely to use CCPA as an 
opportunity for inter-organizational knowledge transfer for two reasons. First, as learning 
capacity grows as a function of a firm’s prior learning endeavors, the firm will become 
more aware of opportunities to learn from its inter-organizational learning relationships, 
and better at scanning for appropriable knowledge. Second, greater learning capacity 
means that a firm will have the technological and human resources needed to assimilate 
and internalize knowledge and resources within its organizational boundaries. Increased 
learning capacity will allow firms to absorb much more of the resources and capabilities 
they encounter through participation in CCPA, increasing the value of their prior 
experience with CCPA. Thus, I predict: 
Hypothesis 4: Learning capacity will positively moderate the relationship 
between prior experience with CCPA and autonomy of CPA. 
Regulatory Complexity 
The salience of its regulatory environment will affect a firm’s motivation to learn 
and develop internal PCPA capabilities. CPA has a stronger influence on firm 
performance among highly regulated industries (Lawton & Rajwani, 2012) and firms 
facing hostile regulatory regimes target different political actors (Holburn & Vanden 
Bergh, 2008). Firms that engage in collective CPA in regions of emerging economies 
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where stronger institutional infrastructure reduce regulatory obstacles are more likely to 
also pursue private political action (Jia, 2014), making their overall approach to CPA 
more autonomous.  
A firm’s regulatory environments can differ from the regulatory environment of 
others on several dimensions. In particular, regulatory environments can exhibit different 
levels of complexity, intensity and stringency. Regulatory complexity reflects the 
quantity and scope of regulation experienced by firms. Regulatory stringency reflects the 
difficulty of meeting the regulatory requirements imposed. Prior CPA research has only 
explored regulatory intensity (e.g. Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014), which reflects the 
fervency with which regulators enforce regulations, and the relative stringency of 
regulations. I focus on regulatory complexity as a more objective, observable, and stable 
measure of the differences in the regulatory environments that firms face.  
Greater regulatory complexity manifests as increases in the scope and quantity of 
regulation. A firm governed by a larger number of regulatory agencies experiences 
greater regulatory complexity. Similarly, regulatory complexity is greater for a firm that 
must comply with a broader scope of regulatory requirements, such as when a firm 
produces and sells different types of regulated products and services. For example, 
different products may have different testing standards, and different financial service 
offerings may require differing degrees of licensing. Greater regulatory complexity 
increases firms’ costs of regulatory compliance, leading to increased managerial attention 
to regulatory issues, reflecting their greater salience. 
Firms that experience greater regulatory complexity are more likely to face 
different political issues and challenges, decreasing the overlap in policy interests that 
58 
 
they share with other firms. The decreased similarity of interests may make some 
interests more difficult to coordinate collectively, reducing firms’ incentives to 
collaborate. If firms cannot pursue some issues collectively, firms have a greater need to 
develop proprietary PCPA capabilities to support private political action, increasing their 
incentive to learn from their CCPA experience. 
Increased regulatory complexity also affects the potential value of the 
opportunities firms have to learn through CCPA. Because of the higher costs associated 
with its regulatory compliance, a firm with greater regulatory complexity may have more 
at stake in seeking to proactively change its regulatory environment to reduce its costs. In 
contrast, a firm facing lower regulatory complexity may have a higher threshold of 
acceptance for the current role of regulators and have less interest in trying to change its 
regulatory environment. Because interests in changing regulatory policy diverge at 
opposite ends of the complexity continuum, political action may be more difficult to 
coordinate collectively, causing a firm with greater regulatory complexity to be motivated 
to build its own PCPA capabilities so that it has greater ability to pursue CPA privately as 
well as collectively, leading to greater autonomy of CPA. Thus, I predict: 
 Hypothesis 5: Regulatory complexity will positively moderate the 
relationship between prior experience with CCPA and autonomy of CPA. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the constructs in my theoretical 
model, and provides a visual summary of my hypotheses.  
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FIGURE 1 
Theoretical Model 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & DATA 
 Despite a fair amount of theoretical attention to collective action, very few 
empirical studies have tested what factors influence a firm’s choice to pursue collective 
action, private action, or both when pursuing political tactics. This chapter explains the 
empirical setting in which this dissertation tests the hypotheses presented in the previous 
chapter. The chapter begins with a brief description of the basic research method 
proposed. I then discuss the empirical context in which I based my study, and I describe 
my sample selection and sample frame. Next, I describe the sources from which I draw 
data and summarize my data collection and management process. Following the section 
of data sources, I list and describe how I constructed an operational measure of each 
conceptual variable. Next, I present the statistical model I use to estimate my conceptual 
model, before turning to the discussion of the actual data analysis and results in the next 
chapter.  
4.1 DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH METHOD 
This dissertation takes a quantitative approach to studying the phenomenon of 
interest, testing the hypothesized causal relationships on a large panel of archival data. 
Because I am interested in isolating firm-level effects, I will conduct my analysis on data 
of a single industry in a single institutional context. The panel data format allows me to 
explore differences both across firms and within firms over time. I estimate models using 
econometric methods and analyze data using Stata, a statistical analysis software 
program.  
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 Empirical Setting 
 I conduct my analysis in the empirical setting of the United States insurance 
industry. In the following section, I provide a brief summary of the United States 
insurance industry and its regulatory framework. I then show how insurance makes an 
ideal setting to explore my research on autonomy of CPA. 
In 2014, the United States insurance industry (including related activities) 
accounted for 2.5% of the United States gross domestic product (Insurance Information 
Institute, 2016). In the same year, insurance carriers wrote $1.1 trillion of net written 
premium (the total direct written, less amount reinsured). Insurance carriers employed an 
annual average 1,448,700 persons in 2014. Agencies, brokers, & other insurance related 
activities employed an additional 1,017,100 persons (Insurance Information Institute, 
2016).  
Under the federal McCarran Ferguson Act (1945), insurance companies are 
regulated by each state rather than by the federal government.1 The National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners is an association of state insurance regulators, formed to 
coordinate regulation of insurance companies operating in multiple states. In 2014, the 
NAIC recognized 6,118 insurance companies as holding licenses in one or more states 
and/or territories. Insurance companies fall into one of two categories: Property & 
Casualty (P&C) and Life & Health (L/H). Because the statutes that enable and constrain 
insurance operations differ between these categories, states license an insurance company 
as only one type of insurer. An insurer may form, for example, under a state’s life 
                                                          
1 In 2008, U.S. Congress repealed sections of McCarran Ferguson as part of the process of healthcare 
reform. This repeal does not apply to P&C insurance and so is beyond the scope of relevance for this 
paper. 
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insurance statute, or the state’s P&C statute, but not both. Insurance groups, made up of a 
holding company and subsidiaries, may contain companies licensed under different 
statutes, but each company licenses pursuant to only one statutory category. The P&C 
Insurance sector accounted for 2,891 of licensed companies in 2014 and the L/H sector 
comprised the remaining 3227 companies (National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 2016). The NAIC further breaks these categories down into five 
reporting groups including Property & Casualty Insurers; Title Insurers; Health Entities; 
Life, Accident & Health Insurers; and Fraternal Societies.  
The insurance market is cyclical in nature, shaped by soft and hard market 
conditions. The insurance market cycle is different from, but related to, the business 
Excludes State Funds and other residual market insurers.  
(*) GDP implicit price deflator adjusted 
Source: ISO®, a Verisk Analytics® business & U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Insurance Market Cycle 
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economic cycle. Figure 2 illustrates the insurance market cycle as a function of yearly 
change in Net Premiums Written (Insurance Standards Office, 2015). In a soft market, 
insurance availability increases as market competition between insurers increases. As 
premium prices drop, the amount of risk assumed per the amount of capital available to 
support the risk increases, until some inflection point where the market begins to harden. 
In a hardening market, insurance prices increase and availability decreases as insurers 
exit some markets or reduce the amount or types of risks they are willing to assume. 
Eventually, the market turns again as potential profitability driven by high premium costs 
attracts additional capital. Market competition is not the only influence on the insurance 
market cycle. Major catastrophes and general economic factors affect the quantity and 
value of capital held by insurers that is available to support risks they assume.  
The insurance industry has a substantial impact on the economic institutions in the 
United States and internationally. Yet, the insurance industry is a relatively novel 
empirical setting in the field of strategy research where few scholars have used insurance 
as an empirical context (for exception see Schimmer, 2012), although it supports an 
active body of research in the applied economics of risk and risk management. This 
relative lack of management research may be an artifact of the intricacies such as those 
presented by the industry’s use of non-GAAP statutory accounting principles (SAP), and 
the industry’s highly specialized technical language. These intricacies may make the 
industry less appealing to outside researchers and those interested in cross-industry 
comparability.  
Despite its proprietary language, the insurance market functions similarly to the 
markets for other goods and services in which management scholars more commonly 
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conduct research. Insurance products relate to the transfer and distribution of risks. Risks 
are future hazards whose frequency and severity are uncertain. Insurance companies that 
operate in the market enter into (sell) contracts called insurance policies through which 
they agree to indemnify (meaning to compensate for harm or loss) the insured or affected 
third-party for losses that may incur as a result of future hazards during the period of time 
specified by the policy. Insurance companies require many of the same resources as 
industrial organizations and service firms, such as human and capital resources. Like 
other industries, differences in the strategies and performance of insurance companies can 
be explained by heterogeneous resources and capabilities possessed by the company and 
its management. 
The insurance industry offers an incredibly rich source of publicly available data. 
All insurers must file detailed annual reports with state insurance regulators. As a result, 
researchers can test hypotheses on the full spectrum of companies, not just large and 
publicly held corporations. I describe the novel and extremely rich data available through 
insurance company statutory filings in the section on sources of data.  
Insurance is an excellent industry in which to study CPA, as its highly complex 
regulatory system makes regulation and the political environment particularly salient 
issues for insurance managers. The insurance industry’s history of political spending 
evidences this salience. In 2014, the insurance industry reported over $151.4 million in 
lobbying expenditures, making it the second largest source of lobbying dollars behind the 
pharmaceuticals industry (Center for Responsive Politics, 2016). In context, this amount 
represents 0.8% of the premium taxes paid by insurers in that year (Insurance Information 
Institute, 2016) or 11.64% of the 2014 aggregate budget of insurance departments. With 
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over twenty national trade associations (Insurance Information Institute, 2016) and 
substantial political activity on the part of individual companies, the insurance industry 
presents an ideal setting to study autonomy of corporate political strategies and the 
configuration of collective and private approaches to CPA. 
My prior work experience helps me understand the complexities of the insurance 
industry and navigate the complicated web of data the industry provides. To complete 
this dissertation I draw on both my training as a management scholar and researcher and 
my knowledge of the insurance industry’s political environment. Before pursuing my 
PhD, I worked for a corporate insurance group for seven and a half years, during which I 
learned to speak the industry’s unique and technical language and the inner workings of 
the industry. In particular, my experience with insurance governance, variations in state 
insurance law, regulatory compliance, and the multi-state regulatory framework of the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners provides me particular insight into the 
empirical and practical setting of my dissertation.  
To validate that my perspective on autonomy of CPA and my hypotheses were 
correct, I spoke with several of my former contacts and other industry experts. My 
insurance company contacts included the CEOs of one regional and one national 
insurance company and the CFO of a national insurance company. My trade association 
contacts include the following people from two national associations: one data specialist, 
three current and former vice presidents of legislative affairs, and one vice president of 
financial policy. My contacts confirmed that firms pursued both private and collective 
strategies, provided additional insight into alliances in the insurance industry, and 
validated that insurance was a good context to study autonomy of CPA. 
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Sample Selection  
I set my dissertation analysis in the P&C industry sub-category to focus my study, 
reduce variation in financial statement data formats, and control for issue-related 
differences in the volatility of the political environment (not theorized in this 
dissertation). Of the five NAIC industry subcategories (Property & Casualty Insurers; 
Title Insurers; Health Entities; Life, Accident & Health Insurers; and Fraternal Societies), 
P&C presents the largest block of insurers reporting on a common statement format. 
Additionally, the regulatory environment of health-related insurers has been particularly 
volatile over the past decade; regulation of health insurance has been the subject of much 
debate and alteration as part of the United States national health-care reform movement.  
My sample consists of the full population of P&C companies operating in the 
United States insurance market between 2005 and 2014. These years represent a 
relatively complete insurance cycle, reflecting both decline and gain in percent change of 
premiums by year (Insurance Information Institute, 2016). The period also corresponds 
with good availability of electronic data. My sample consists of the full population of 
during the sample time period. Because filing with the NAIC is compulsory, I am able to 
observe an unusually complete panel of insurance companies.  
4.2 DATA COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT 
Data Sources  
The archival data analyzed in this dissertation come from several sources, 
including proprietary data repositories and publicly available datasets. In the following 
section, I will identify the various types and sources of data I collected. 
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My primary data source is the statutory financial statements filed by all United 
States-licensed and authorized insurance companies and collected and compiled by the 
NAIC. Insurers file quarterly and annual statements that contain a vast array of financial, 
managerial, and demographic information. The NAIC maintains a data repository that 
includes quarterly and annual filing data, updated annually. Firms file annual and 
quarterly financial statements on one of five types of statement blanks tailored to the 
different categories of insurance. These categories include Property & Casualty (P&C) 
insurance; Life, Accident & Health insurance; Fraternal insurance; Title insurance, and 
Health insurance. The P&C annual statement is affectionately known within the industry 
as the Yellow Peril in recognition of the bright yellow cardstock cover in which print 
versions of the statement were historically bound.  
Under the federal McCarran Ferguson Act (1945), each state regulates the 
insurance companies that operates in its boundaries, but the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) facilitates and has largely standardized reporting 
requirements across states. The NAIC formed in 1871 to coordinate regulation of 
insurance companies operating in multiple states. The association is governed by 
insurance regulators from 56 states, territories, and districts and maintains offices in three 
United States cities. The NAIC’s stated mission is (National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 2015: para. 5): 
to assist state insurance regulators, individually and collectively, in 
serving the public interest and achieving the following fundamental 
insurance regulatory goals in a responsive, efficient and cost effective 
manner, consistent with the wishes of its members: Protect the public 
interest; Promote competitive markets; Facilitate the fair and equitable 
treatment of insurance consumers; Promote the reliability, solvency and 
financial solidity of insurance institutions; and Support and improve state 
regulation of insurance.  
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For this dissertation, I acquired all P&C annual statement filing data for the years 
2000 through 2014.2 The database includes both quantitative and qualitative data 
formatted as .csv (text saved as a spreadsheet) files. Each year of data includes between 
263 and 432 separate .csv files containing data from specific statutory page, supplement, 
and exhibit numbers. Each .csv file corresponds to a separate .pdf file describing the 
record layout. The database is comprehensive for quantitative data across all years, but 
the amount of qualitative data included in the database varies over time, improving with 
advancements in filing formats. In earlier years, not all qualitative fields were converted 
and included in the electronic repository. For example, the first page (known as the jurat, 
or signatory, page) of the P&C annual statement lists the names of each of the company’s 
officers, directors and trustees. In 2005 and 2006 only, the first three names were stored 
in the electronic data repository. In 2007, the format of the repository’s record layout for 
the first page data expanded to record all officers’ and directors’ names. 
I supplemented the NAIC database with insurance company information from 
A.M. Best Company. A.M. Best provides insurance company ratings, financial data, and 
industry-focused news among other insurance information products and services (A.M. 
Best, 2016). Through their insurance data custom projects service, I acquired the names 
and titles of P&C insurance company officers and directors for 2005 and 2006, and the 
calculated quick liquidity ratios for P&C insurers from 2005 through 2014.  
                                                          
2 The data I acquired excludes filings made by captive insurers. Captive insurance is a special type of 
insurance where the captive insurer is a wholly owned subsidiary of an existing business entity for the 
specific purpose of insuring only the risks of the insurer’s parent and affiliate companies. Because captive 
insurers do not offer insurance in the primary insurance marketplace, the NAIC has ruled that the 
demographic and other information contained in their statutory statements are not publicly available. 
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I further supplemented the NAIC database with data on alliance formations from 
the SDC Alliance and Joint Ventures Database. The SDC data I acquired includes data on 
alliances formed by one or more companies in 4-digit SIC Code classification 6331 (Fire, 
Marine, & Casualty Insurance), 6351 (Surety Insurance), and 6361 (Title Insurance). The 
data includes 233 observations of alliances and joint ventures during years 2000 through 
2014. In order to better understand the nature of alliances in the insurance industry, I 
conducted informal interviews with two expert informants in December 2015. 
I collected data on national and state political office holders from several publicly 
available primary and secondary sources. This data extends further back in time than my 
primary dataset to allow me to observe political experience gained by individuals prior to 
becoming directors and/or officers of companies in my sample. For state political office-
holders, I combined data on state legislators from the Individual State Legislator Shor-
McCarty Ideology Data (Shor & McCarty, 2015) and the State Legislative Election 
Returns (1967-2010) database (Klarner et al., 2012). The Klarner et al. (2012) database is 
a panel of 308,125 election outcomes by state and year that includes individual-level data 
on elected and seated legislators. The Shor-McCarty (2015) database provides individual-
level data on 20,783 legislators from 1993 through 2004. I supplemented the state 
legislator data with the Governors Dataset (Klarner, 2013) and data on state Governors 
gathered from official state websites. The Governors Dataset includes a panel of 7,818 
observations by state and year of information on the Governors of 50 states from 1925 to 
2016.  
For data on national political office holders, I collected demographic data on 
members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives from the Biographical 
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Directory of the United States Congress website (bioguide.congress.gov). For data on 
members of United States Senate and House committees I combined the Committees in 
the U.S. Congress, 1947-1992 dataset (Nelson, 2005) and the Congressional Committee 
Assignments, 103rd to 112th Congresses, 1993—2011 dataset (Stewart & Woon, 2011) 
with the House and Senate Committee Rosters for the 113th Congress (CQ Press, 2015).  
Data Management 
 A major contribution of this dissertation is the novel data used to test hypotheses, 
but the scope and complexity of the data presented distinct challenges in terms of data 
management. In the following section, I summarize my data management process. First, I 
discuss the process by which I extracted the data of interest from the NAIC dataset. Next, 
I describe my process for coding the SDC alliance data, and for combining the political 
datasets. I then briefly address the issue of record linkage and data disambiguation. 
Finally, I describe my protocol for managing the code used to create my dissertation 
dataset. 
 In order to test my hypotheses, I had to extract the specific data of interest from 
the large quantity of data contained in the NAIC Annual Statement data. My first step 
was to create a series of tables that mapped the location of critical data items in the 
collection of .csv files, copies of which I attach as Appendix A. The map was required 
because the format of the statement blank changed over time as the NAIC modified the 
statement to improve the information collected for regulators, to reflect changes in 
insurance laws and regulation, and in response to emerging issues. As a result, a given 
piece of information (e.g., the value of a company’s total liabilities) may correspond to a 
different line number and/or page number in different years. The .csv files arrived with 
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data organized in long format (few columns but many rows), where two or more columns 
created a matrix of line identifiers and values. To add to the complexity, the record layout 
document did not record changes in line number. I acquired a .pdf or print version of each 
statement year in order to verify manually the line number and location of the 
information of interest. 
The variables are located in cells nested in varying columns, identified by line 
numbers within numbered files. Although the files are numbered in a roughly sequential 
order, some exhibits (or pages) are broken out into multiple files (or combined into single 
files) across years, and may appear in a different order within the statement. Each file 
number is comprised of eight digits including the letter P denoting the P&C statement 
form, a four-digit year identifier, and a three-digit file identifier. The conversion sheet 
allowed me to generate code in Stata to extract common information from different 
record locations and combine them into a tractable wide-format data file.  
Calculating autonomy of CPA, described more fully in the next chapter, provides 
an example of the challenge presented by the data mapping process. To calculate the 
variable, I use data from the Other section of the statements’ general interrogatories. The 
content and format of this section was unchanged between 2000 and 2014, but the three 
digit file identifier of the appropriate file changed nine times and the range of line 
numbers associated with the data changed nine times (but not parallel with the change in 
file identifiers) from 40a through 42b in 2000 to 33.1 through 35.2 in 2014. The numeric 
values of the data are in two different columns and the qualitative detail in a third 
column. The number identifying each of the three columns in the record layout changed 
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either two or five times between 2000 and 2014. Appendix A includes select tables from 
the conversion sheet. 
To get from data embedded in a series of .csv files to a single dataset on which I 
could run analysis, I generated a series of Stata .do files. To help organize these files and 
to make sure the process was replicable I created a data management protocol in 
Microsoft Excel. The protocol describes a workflow where separate branches, associated 
with data from different parts of the statement form, go through separate do-file 
sequences before converging into a single process branch. I chose this more complex 
workflow protocol rather than a single sequential process to allow me to update changes 
to the data management code in any given branch to by rerunning just the code in the 
given branch and from the convergence point forward. In general, each branch process 
contained two convergence stages, which I describe as an “append” stage and a “post-
append” stage, and generated between two and sixteen intermediate data files. Appendix 
B provides a copy of the protocol summary. 
Because the SDC database returned only 232 records of alliances in the SIC codes 
associated with my sample (6331, 6351, and 6361), I coded the SDC Alliance data by 
hand. The data I used consisted of three fields of data including a quantitative field listing 
the date the alliance was announced, a qualitative list of the participants’ short names, 
and a short text description of the deal. I first reviewed each deal description to verify it 
involved one or more property/casualty insurers and to extract names of parent 
companies not listed among the participants. I generated a list of deal participants for 
each year across observations and eliminated any that were clearly not property/casualty 
insurance companies (such as manufacturers or life insurers). I next matched this list of 
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deal participants to companies in my dataset on a year-by-year basis, to prevent falsely 
attributing alliances to firms who later merged with the true alliance participant.  
The SDC data reported deal participants at either corporate or business unit levels, 
whereas the observations in my NAIC-based dataset are at the business unit level. I drew 
on my experience in the insurance industry, consulted the A.M. Best and website and 
performed Google searches to link business units and corporate parents and affiliates. 
When the SDC deal participant matched my dataset at the business unit level, I recorded 
both the NAIC Company Code and Group Code (if applicable). When the SDC deal 
participant did not match to a business unit in my data set, but matched at the corporate 
level, I recorded the NAIC Group Code. Finally, I calculated a sum of alliances by firm 
year and by group year.  
The data management protocol includes two branches related to the political data 
I use. This group of data required the least transformation, most likely because it 
comprised data sets whose authors have processed and formatted the data for use in prior 
studies. In terms of the Senate and House Committees’ data, data management primarily 
consisted of merging the data sets, extracting the committees of interest and transforming 
the data from a committee by year panel to a state by year panel. Similarly, combining 
the Shor-McCarty (2015), and Klarner et al. (2012) state legislator databases with the 
Klarner (2013) governors’ database primarily involved recoding some variables for 
consistency across data sets and converting the files to a common, merge-able format. 
For instance, the Shor-McCarty database is in a wide panel format with many columns 
and a single row per individual. The Klarner et al. (2012) legislator database, on the other 
hand, is in a long panel format with many rows (168,262) each representing a legislator 
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elected in a given state year. For this dissertation, I was only interested in time as an 
attribute of the political office-holder’s tenure, so I transformed the data sets into cross-
sectional data and combined the files. The most time-consuming aspect of working with 
individual name-identified data involved standardizing the names to facilitate record 
linkage and disambiguation. 
To manage my dissertation data, I adopted a number of record linkage techniques. 
Record linkage is the process of matching data on one entity across multiple databases, or 
eliminating duplication in a single data set by connecting all observations on that entity 
(Christen, 2012). Data scientists also call the process data disambiguation because prior 
to linking, ambiguity exists as to whether or not the data relate to the same entity. Unique 
data identifiers for each entity facilitate record linkage. The NAIC data I analyze 
uniquely identifies my unit of analysis (the insurance companies) by numeric company 
code (CoCode), and I could easily match data across data files using merge commands. 
Low quality data identifiers make record linkage more challenging when they are not 
completely unique or provide inconsistent and/or insufficient information. Individual 
names are a common record linkage challenge; names are poor data identifiers because 
they are rarely unique, are entered in inconsistent and often incomplete formats, are 
frequently misspelled, and may change over the course of a person’s life. Unfortunately, 
individual names are the most commonly used individual identifier, and my political 
resource hypotheses rely heavily on coding individual-level data.  
The process of record linkage involves several steps. The first step involves reducing 
ambiguity by standardizing the data fields. The second step, known as indexing, involves 
identifying what other attributes associated with an observation can be used to help 
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confirm or disconfirm a match. Next, the process involves grouping possible matches 
together (frequently in pairs if matching datasets), and finally qualitatively evaluating the 
linkage (Christen, 2012). Ultimately, record linkage tools cannot be relied on to match 
data; they can only narrow the field to make qualitative matching faster and easier, and 
even this capacity relies on the researcher’s ability to identify and design meaningful 
indexing criteria. 
 Stata offers multiple programs to assist researchers with data linkage, including 
the user-written programs reclink and reclink2, and the soundex command. Reclink 
(Blasnik, 2010) uses bigram-type string comparators and user-defined indexing weights 
to match a “best” pair of records one to one across separate data files. Reclink2 (Wasi & 
Flaaen, 2015) builds on and generalizes reclink to allow many to one matching between 
data files, which can help when adding an additional year of data (for example) or when 
matching an entity in one file to more than one potential “best match” in another file. 
Stata’s soundex command uses a phonetic algorithm to convert string data by replacing 
heterographic homophones (groups of letters spelled differently but pronounced the 
same, e.g., ph and f) with a numeric code. Soundex is useful for removing spelling errors 
and data ambiguity that may occur when a name has multiple common spellings. 
Soundex can generate potential matches both across files and within a single data file.  
I used both reclink variants and soundex in aggregating and de-duplicating my 
dissertation data. To combine the Klarner et al. (2012) and Shor-McCarty (2015) state 
legislator datasets I first standardized the legislator’s name field so that each dataset used 
the same format. I selected the following four variables common to both datasets to use 
as additional matching attributes: state, first year in office, party affiliation, and 
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legislative chamber. Next, I merged the files to identify perfect matches. After removing 
the perfect matches and saving them to a new file, I ran reclink and exported the results to 
a spreadsheet, which I reviewed by hand, keeping qualitatively good matches and 
rejecting matches I assessed as type two errors by deleting the fields added from the 
using file. I imported the resulting file of matched data and unmatched data from the 
master and using files and appended it to the saved perfect matches. As a last step, I 
merged the file to the reclink using file in order to add back the data from the using file 
that I had deleted in rejecting the type two errors.  
The largest data disambiguation project in my data was undoubtedly cleaning the 
directors and officers (D&O) data fields and preparing them for match to the political 
data files. The NAIC dataset contains D&O data for every filing company from 2007 
through 2014, which I appended into a single file. This data file contained the following 
fields: first name, middle name, last name, suffix, title, company code, and year. The 
A.M. Best file of D&O data for 2005 and 2006 listed name, title, and company code in 
three fields. I cleaned and standardized the datasets separately due to issues of data 
availability timing, format, and iterative learning, but generally applied the same basic 
process to both files, as recorded in Stata .do files listed in my data management protocol. 
The cleaned and standardized data presented distinct challenges to disambiguation. 
First off, the primarily company-level dataset provided no additional individual-level 
attributes to support name matching. Second, names had potential to vary across multiple 
intersecting fields. The name of an individual could vary within a single company across 
years if the data were entered inconsistently or misspelled in some years. For individuals 
who served multiple companies, names could also vary across companies within and 
77 
 
across years. Finally, some name data even varied within a single company year when an 
individual who served as both a director and an officer’s name appeared multiple ways. I 
capitalized on the relative stability of company directors and officers over time by first 
disambiguating within company code across years then across companies and years.  
I ended up using a combination of soundex and relatively basic Stata commands 
rather than the more sophisticated record linkage tools, because I was concerned about 
record ambiguity within a file rather than across files. I used duplicate tag and 
egen/group syntax to group potentially duplicate names in multiple stages. At each stage 
I used multiple approaches, including matching on soundex-transform or first letter of a 
name field and excluding whole fields from the duplicate criteria. I attempted to preserve 
name variants that provided more information and were most commonly used and 
automated as much of the string replacement as feasible. For example, I first coded the 
length of a middle name string, and then tagged the number of duplicates that matched 
using the full middle name and the number that matched using just the first initial. I 
grouped the potentially matching names if the number of duplicates were unequal, and 
ordered the observations within the group by the length variable. After quickly scanning 
to look for exceptions (such as when a father and son who share first and last names but 
have different middle names work for the same company), I executed code that replaced 
all middle name strings in a group with the full middle name listed in the first 
observation. When matching across companies and years, I used company-level attributes 
including company name, group name, and domicile state to assess potential qualitative 
matches. 
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After disambiguating D&O names within both the NAIC and A.M. Best files, I 
appended the files and repeated the process, again removing variation within companies 
and across years first, then between companies and years. Although this added one more 
step than would have been needed if I had been able to combine the files before starting 
the disambiguation, I was able to reuse much of the code I used on the previous files that 
sped up the process. Finally, to prepare to match the D&O data to the political data, I 
generated a unique ID number for each distinct name in the D&O data, saved the full 
firm by year by individual panel, and created a reduced file containing just the cross-
section of D&O individuals. To create the political resource data, I used reclink2 to 
match the individuals in the D&O cross-sectional file on a one to one basis to individuals 
in the political data, indexing on state where appropriate and using various date data to 
assess the quality of potential matches.  
The trade-off to data disambiguation is the potential to introduce type one 
measurement error in the process of eliminating (or drastically reducing) type two 
measurement error that exists when multiple observations of a single person are treated as 
separate individuals because the name data is ambiguous. In general, data disambiguation 
should reduce total measurement error. If the remaining error is as good as randomly 
(AGAR) distributed, I can reasonably ignore its effect on my analysis (Rubin, 1976). 
Despite the possibility that I may have been more accurate in reducing duplication among 
names of people I recognized from my experience working in the insurance industry, and 
the reality that soundex is better at matching names originating from English-language 
cultures, I assume that type one and type two data are AGAR in my D&O and political 
datasets.  
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4.3 VARIABLES AND OPERATIONAL MEASURES 
 My theoretical model predicts effects of three main explanatory variables and two 
moderating variables on a single dependent variable. In the following section, I describe 
how I constructed operational measures of each conceptual variable for use in hypothesis 
testing. Table 2 provides a summary of the operational variables.  
Dependent Variable: Autonomy of CPA 
 The dependent variable in this dissertation is Autonomy of CPA. Unlike most prior 
work on CPA, I follow De Figueiredo and Tiller (2001) and Ozer and Lee (2009) in 
measuring a firm’s mode of political action on a continuum rather than as a dichotomous 
or categorical choice. Autonomy measures the proportion of total CPA pursued through 
private means, and reflects the degree to which firms pursue strategic value from their 
regulatory environment. I observe firm level of spending on CPA, recorded as private 
(PCPA) or collective (CCPA). I calculate Autonomy of CPA as: 
𝑃𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡
 
As stated in Chapter III, my definition of autonomy as a continuum provides 
distinct benefits. First, it allows us to observe both a firm’s use of CCPA and PCPA in a 
single measure. Next, it captures and summarizes a dynamic construct that varies over 
time. A continuum provides additional measurement-based benefits in that it brings all 
observations onto a common scale, providing many of the benefits associated with 
normalizing variables and allowing improved inter-firm comparison.  
I measure autonomy as a proportion rather than as another type of continuum for 
several reasons. First, a proportion-based measure is conceptually intuitive when  
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TABLE 2 
Summary of Operational Definitions of Variables 
Variable Operational Definitions 
Dependent Variable  
Autonomy of CPA 
Private Political Spending as Proportion of Total (Private and 
Collective) Political Spending 
Explanatory Variables 
Alliance Experience  
Non-Equity Alliance 
Experience 
Log of the Count of Reinsurance Alliances Partners and SDC 
Alliances Announced Within the Prior 5 Years 
Equity Alliance 
Experience 
Log of the Count of Equity Investments made in Alliances and 
Joint Ventures Within the Prior 5 Years 
Political Resources  
National Political 
Resources 
Number of Directors and/or Officers of a Company who Served in 
U.S. Congress 
State Political Resources 
Log of Number of Directors and/or Officers of a Company who 
Served in State Legislatures or as State Governor 
CCPA Experience  
Prior Collective CPA 
Experience Lagged Collective Political Spending (CCPA at Year t-3) 
Moderating Variables 
Learning Capacity  
Learning Capacity Total Payroll & Employee Welfare Expense 
Regulatory Complexity  
Quantity of Regulators Log of the Number of States in Which the Company is Licensed 
Scope of Regulation 
Log of the Number of Lines of Insurance the Company is 
Authorized to Offer 
Control Variables 
Senate Access 
Square of the Number of Senators from a Company's State of 
Domicile Assigned to the Senate Banking Committee 
House of Rep. Access 
Log of Representatives from a Company's State of Domicile 
Assigned to House Financial Services Committee 
Market Share Company Premium as a Proportion of All Premiums 
Firm Age Years Elapsed Since Company Commenced Business 
Corporate Group 
Whether Company is a Members of Insurance Holding Corporation 
System 
Slack Quick Liquidity Ratio 
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considering how firms configure two similar actions, and scales easily to correspond to 
another easy to understand continuum such as percentage. Most importantly, it 
maximizes statistical power by including all observations where the company engaged in 
either or both modes of action, allowing more firms to be included in the analysis than a 
would be allowed by a ratio of one mode to the other. Firms with a higher level of 
autonomy place greater emphasis on PCPA than do firms with lower levels of autonomy. 
If observed continually, firm level of autonomy shifts with each additional action taken. 
Given a set level of autonomy not equal to one, an additional privately pursued action 
will always increase autonomy; although both the numerator and the denominator 
increase, the numerator increases at a greater rate than the denominator.  
If firms engage in either only CCPA or only PCPA, the firm will have an 
autonomy score at one of the ends of the range. Firms that only pursue CCPA will have a 
zero autonomy score, and additional collective actions will not affect their scores. 
Similarly, firms that only pursue PCPA will have an autonomy score of one, and 
additional private actions will not affect their scores. How substantially autonomy 
changes with an additional political action depends on the relationship between the 
frequency and expense of a firm’s actions. Firms that take few, expensive actions will 
experience greater turbulence in autonomy scores, while firms that engage in more 
frequent, less costly actions will have autonomy scores that change more incrementally. 
 I measure autonomy using data from the NAIC P&C annual statement general 
interrogatories. The Other section of the general interrogatories contains data on firm’s 
regulatory expenditures. The NAIC provides filing companies with the following 
82 
 
instructions for responding to this interrogatory (National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 2015b: 14): 
33. The purpose of this General Interrogatory is to capture information about payments 
to any trade association, service organization, and statistical or rating bureau. A service 
organization is defined as every person, partnership, association or corporation that 
formulates rules, establishes standards, or assists in the making of rates or standards or 
the information or benefit of insurers or rating organizations. 
 
34. The purpose of this General Interrogatory is to capture information about legal 
expenses paid during the year. These expenses include all fees or retainers for legal 
services or expenses including those in connection with matters before administrative or 
legislative bodies. It excludes salaries and expenses of company personnel, legal 
expenses in connection with investigation, litigation and settlement of policy claims, and 
legal fees associated with real estate transactions including mortgage loans on real 
estate. Do not include amounts reported in General Interrogatories No. 33 and No. 35. 
 
35. The purpose of this General Interrogatory is to capture information about 
expenditures in connection with matters before legislative bodies, officers or departments 
of government paid during the year. These expenses are related to general legislative 
lobbying and direct lobbying of pending and proposed statutes or regulations before 
legislative bodies and/or officers or departments of government. Do not include amounts 
reported in General Interrogatories No. 33 and No. 34. 
 
I code autonomy of CPA by automatically assigning expenditures reported in the 
first interrogatory as CCPA, and expenditures reported in the second interrogatory as 
PCPA. I individually code responses to the third interrogatory to either CCPA or PCPA 
depending on the information provided in the response detail. I drop data with no detail in 
responses to the third interrogatory because I am unable to code it as collective or 
individual.  
The statutory reporting requirements of my empirical setting allow me to observe 
more about firms’ CPA expenditures than is common for all industries, including 
participation in formal associations. Although trade associations represent most collective 
political action on companies, not all collective CPA need be organized through formal 
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channels. My measure of autonomy captures only those collective actions organized 
through formal associations. 
Explanatory Variable: Alliance Experience 
I measure alliance experience separately for equity and non-equity alliances, in 
response to scholars who argue that focusing exclusively on equity alliances forms an 
incomplete picture of their effect (Cullen Johnson & Satako, 1995; Zollo Reuer, & 
Singh., 2002). One of the key features of my dissertation is the extremely rich data on 
which I test my hypotheses. To both ground my study in prior literature and take 
advantage of the unique data, I drew from existing measures of alliances in the 
management literature and interviewed industry experts about how alliances manifest in 
the insurance market.  
Equity Alliance Experience. I operationalize Equity Alliance Experience in a 
manner consistent with the alliance literature in management research. Research 
employing archival data relies primarily on counts of prior alliances to serve as a measure 
of the accumulation of alliance experience (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Because archival 
data sources primarily record alliance formations, this measure often takes the form of 
cumulative counts of alliance formations (e.g. Sampson, 2005; Wang & Zajac, 2007). To 
eliminate left censoring of data caused by observing alliances formed after a specific year 
(such as the beginning of a data set), researchers count cumulative alliance formations 
over a rolling prior five-year period (Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007) or calculate the 
average number of alliances formed per year over a period (e.g., Villalonga & McGahan, 
2005). I adopt this measure as it reflects a firm’s opportunities to learn from its alliance 
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experience over a meaningfully recent period and because alliance termination data is not 
consistently available for all of my alliance measures.  
For my measure of equity-based alliance experience, I observed investments in 
Affiliates, Joint Ventures, and Partnerships as reported in Schedule BA Parts 1 and 2 
(depending on year) of the NAIC P&C statutory annual statement. An affiliate is defined 
by regulators as any company that shares common ownership, control, operation, or 
management with an insurer, where common control is presumed to exist if the insurer 
owns 10% or more equity in the affiliate (NAIC, 2015c). I excluded investments reported 
as having characteristics of fixed income instruments, real estate, and collateral loans; 
collateral loans are a form of securities lending rather than an indicator of alliance 
activity. Further, I eliminated investments in mutual funds to eliminate measurement 
error associated with their misclassification. For each firm year, I calculated the number 
of alliance investments reported (Ai,t) and summed this value over a five-year window 
ending in the observation year. Because I anticipate diminishing returns to the knowledge 
acquired as firms’ number of alliances increase, I report the natural log of the five-year 
sum as Equity Alliance Experience. 
 Non-equity Alliance Experience. Because much of the existing literature on 
alliance experience studies the bio-tech industry, I interviewed insurance industry experts 
to make sure I understood if alliance concepts articulated from that setting had corollaries 
in the insurance industry. I asked each interviewee to read a short summary of concepts 
from the alliance literature via email. I then gave them examples of alliances in biotech 
and R&D, and asked them to think of similar relationships insurers pursued related to 
market activities. The interviews revealed two primary types of alliances insurers form: 
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MGAs (managing general agency relationships) and reinsurance fronting. I reviewed the 
NAIC annual statement data and determined that I would be able to observe reinsurance 
fronting arrangements consistently over the sample period. 
 Reinsurance fronting involves one insurance company (the front) issuing policies 
that it then fully (or close to fully) reinsures to another insurance company. Such 
arrangements exist to allow companies to pool complementary resources to serve 
insurance consumers that neither firm could currently serve given their individual 
resource endowments. In the case of reinsurance fronting, one company has capacity and 
appetite for a particular type of risk, but lacks the regulatory resources (usually in the 
form of license to provide insurance in the given jurisdiction) to pursue the business on 
its own. Reinsurance fronting is not a simple market activity like partial cessions and 
quota-share reinsurance, but relies instead on relationships built between partner insurers 
with complementary resources and interests.  
Insurers are required to report reinsurance contracts that involve cession of 75% 
or more of direct premiums written in Exhibit F Part 3 of the statutory annual statement. 
For each firm year, I observe each such fronting relationship reported. I calculate the 
number of distinct fronting/alliance partners a firm reports in a given year. I then 
calculate the number of distinct fronting/alliance partners reported during a moving 
window of five years ending with the observation year. I chose to include distinct 
partners listed rather than repeat count partners with each year because I view 
relationships that spill over from year to year as continuations of the same alliance rather 
than formations of new alliances. 
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 To ground my study in the alliance literature, I supplemented my NAIC data with 
data from the SDC Alliance and Joint Ventures Database, a data source frequently used 
to study alliance experience (add cite). As described in the data sources section above, I 
code the SDC data at both the firm and group levels. For each firm that does not belong 
to a corporate group, I recorded alliance at the company level. For each firm that belongs 
to a corporate group, I recorded alliances at the group level, reflecting alliances formed 
by any member of their corporate group. I next compared each firm’s SDC alliance 
announcements to its equity alliance investments made in the year before through the 
year following the alliance’s announcement, and calculated the sum over five years of 
alliances not already observed as equity alliances. Finally, to calculate a firm’s non-
equity alliance experience, I combine the five-year sums of the number of non-equity 
alliances from the SDC database with the five-year sums of number of unique fronting 
alliance partners from Schedule F, and take the natural log of the total. 
Explanatory Variable: Political Resources  
I measure political resources as the political experience of a company’s officers or 
of members of its Board of Directors. I measure this experience two ways to reflect the 
different levels that make up the insurance regulatory environment: state and federal 
governments. The political experience of a company’s directors and officers acts a proxy 
for the political knowledge and know-how of the firm’s strategic decision makers. This 
experience also encompasses the political relationships and influence held by directors 
and officers that a firm may hope to use to its own advantage or activate through 
affiliation with the given director. This study does not assume that the a politically 
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connected director or officer directly performs the activities and tactics that make up a 
firm’s corporate political strategy. 
State Political Resources. Historically, insurance has been part of a primarily 
state-based regulatory environment. Per the McCarran–Ferguson Act (1945), insurance 
companies in the United States are regulated at the state level. States empower regulatory 
agencies, generally known as Insurance Departments, and establish insurance laws and 
regulations through state legislative processes. I measure each firm’s state-based political 
experience as the number of its directors and officers that served as a state Governor or in 
the legislature of its state of domicile. Because I anticipate diminishing marginal returns 
to the knowledge and relationships gained through additional directors’ experience, I take 
the natural log of the count.  
National Political Resources. In addition to the official state-based regulatory 
framework, insurers must attend to the national political environment. Although health 
insurance is outside the scope of this study, readers may be familiar with the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010), the most widely recognized and successful 
attempt to govern (health) insurance at the federal level. Within the context of property 
and casualty insurance, examples of federal insurance regulation include the Federal 
Liability Risk Retention Act (1986) and several recent attempts to create an optional 
federal charter. I measure a company’s national level political experience as the number 
of its directors and officers who served in the United States Congress.  
Explanatory Variable: Prior Collective CPA  
To measure the opportunities a firm had to learn and develop firm-specific 
political capabilities through prior CCPA experience, I record the amount the firm spent 
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on CCPA three years prior to the observation year. To evaluate the measure, I compared 
the effect of measuring three-year versus five-year lags; the results were similar. 
Ultimately, I chose the three-year lag because three years reflects a meaningful window 
of prior experience’s influence on current strategy (Parmigiani & Holloway, 2011) and 
the length of time a firm might invest in deliberate learning through the association. To 
better match the scale of the dependent variable, I scale and report dollars spent are in 
hundreds of millions. As with my measure of autonomy of CPA, my measure of prior 
CCPA captures only collective actions organized through formal associations. This 
measure appropriately reflects a firm’s access to the knowledge, skills, and routines 
embedded in formal organizations of collective action. 
Moderator Variable: Learning Capacity 
Learning Capacity. In Chapter III, I propose that a firm’s ability to internalize 
political knowledge and capabilities it develops through participation in CCPA and 
translate that knowledge into increased autonomy depends on the firm’s capacity for 
learning. Although firm knowledge can be stored in many formats, the ability of a firm to 
encode and make use of new knowledge is embedded in a firm’s human resources. 
Assuming that greater human resources provide increased capacity to learn, encode, and 
apply new knowledge, I measure a firm’s expenditures on payroll and employee welfare 
as a proxy for its learning capacity. Payroll and employee welfare expenditures are the 
best measure of learning capacity in a service industry where R&D is not a meaningful 
measure. 
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Moderator Variable: Regulatory Complexity  
In Hypothesis 5, I propose that the complexity of a firm’s regulatory environment 
moderates the relationship between prior CCPA experience and increased autonomy of 
CPA. I argue that the costs, risks, and potential opportunities posed by regulation make 
CPA more salient and strategically important. Prior CPA research has tested the related 
construct of regulatory intensity instead of complexity. I assume that the stringency of 
laws and regulations are relatively constant across states as a function of the NAIC’s 
efforts toward uniformity. I measure regulatory complexity in two ways: as the number of 
state regulators to whom a company is accountable, and as the number of lines of 
insurance, which determines the scope of rules and regulations to which their operations 
expose the company. These measures best reflect the differences between firms in how 
much regulation they face, and how many different regulatory regimes with which they 
may need to gain access and interface. 
Quantity of Regulators. I measure the quantity of regulators to whom a company 
is accountable as the log of the number of states in which a company is licensed. Each 
state has its own primary insurance regulator that holds authority to regulate all 
companies licensed in its jurisdiction. Each state also has its own legislative body and 
process that determines the laws, rules and regulations that insurance departments 
enforce. The greater the number of states in which a firm is licensed, the greater is the 
number of regulatory regimes and potentially idiosyncratic state laws the firm must 
manage. To reflect likely diminishing marginal complexity, I take the natural log of the 
count of state licenses. 
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Scope of Regulation. I use the number of lines of business a company is 
authorized to sell as a proxy for the variety and scope of rules and regulations that inform 
regulatory complexity. The NAIC categorizes thirty-five lines of insurance under the 
P&C umbrella, including three types of reinsurance. A list of the different lines of 
insurance is included in the tables in Appendix A. Firms must file rates and forms for 
different lines of insurance (such as homeowner’s insurance or professional liability), 
exposing the firm to different scopes of regulation. States may also adopt laws and 
regulations particular to different lines of insurance. Because of increased filing 
requirements, rules and regulations, and line-specific laws, a firm that offers many lines 
of insurance has a more complex regulatory environment. Although the amount of 
distinct regulation imposed by each line varies, number of lines serves as a rough proxy 
for the scope of a firm’s regulatory requirements. To reflect that some amount of 
similarity will likely apply between any pair of lines, resulting in decreasing marginal 
complexity, I take the natural log of the number of lines a firm offers. 
Control Variables 
 In order to isolate the effects of my explanatory and moderator variables, I include 
several control variables in my statistical model. Prior empirical research on factors that 
influence the autonomy of CPA are extremely limited. Both De Figueiredo and Tiller 
(2001) and Ozer and Lee (2009) draw on Olson’s (1965) theory of collection and 
emphasize industry concentration. My single industry context setting allows me to 
automatically control for between-industry effects. The broader literature on the 
antecedents of CPA adds institutional and firm-level factors worth considering. Again, 
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because my data came only from U.S.-licensed companies, I implicitly control for 
institutional factors. 
I control for a set of time variant state-level political variables associated with 
firms’ potential alternate access to political influence. Because political office holders are 
more responsive to their constituents than to non-constituents (Long, 1997), I control for 
possible constituency access effects that might accrue to firms through the Senators and 
Representatives of their state of domicile. The Senate Banking and House Financial 
Affairs committees act as gatekeepers of important insurance policy issues in United 
States Congress. I control for access to the Senate Committee by measuring the natural 
log of the number of seats on the committee held by Senators from a firm’s state of 
domicile. I control for Access to the House Committee by measuring the square of the 
number of seats on the committee held by Representatives from a firm’s state of 
domicile. 
I include several additional firm level controls. I measure a company’s quick 
liquidity ratio as control for firms’ level of available Slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983), a 
variable that CPA researchers commonly observe (e.g., Lenway & Rehbein, 1991). Here, 
slack represents resources that are easy to access and deploy, rather than resources that 
are absorbed or unabsorbed (Borgeois & Singh, 1983). The quick liquidity ratio measures 
an insurance company’s quick assets divided by net liabilities plus ceded reinsurance 
balances payable, making it a meaningful measure of slack in the insurance context 
(Schimmer, 2012). Quick assets are the sum of cash, unaffiliated short-term investments, 
unaffiliated bonds maturing within one year, government bonds maturing within five 
years, and 80% of unaffiliated common stocks (A.M. Best, 2016).  
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I measure Market Share as a firm’s total premiums for a given year (left-censored 
at zero) as a proportion of the sum of total premiums for all firms in that year to control 
for effects of firm size and market power. The conventional measures of firm size in 
management research are total sales and total assets (e.g. Waddock & Graves, 1997). In 
my empirical setting of P&C Insurance, statutory accounting principles unique to the 
industry complicate measurements of firm size. For example, firm size measured as total 
assets includes not only the firm’s assets, but also assets held by the firm in reserve for 
future payment of losses to policyholders. Because of statutory accounting standards, 
firm size measured as sales can quite possibly be negative. In insurance, written 
premiums are the equivalent of sales. However, in insurance, firms must earn premiums 
over the life of the policy; if the insurer or insured cancels policies sold in the prior 
period sales in the current period may be negative. I left censor my measure of market 
share at zero to make the notion of market share more intuitive. Market share is fully 
correlated with firm size measured as total premiums written r(21,327) = 1.00, p<0.01. 
Both market share and firm size are significantly correlated with Learning Capacity 
r(21,327) = 0.88, p<0.01. 
I calculate the years transpired since the company commenced business to control 
for Firm Age. Lastly, I include a dummy indicator of whether or not the company reports 
to the NAIC as a member of a Corporate Group.  
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Statistical Estimation 
In order to analyze the effect of my explanatory and moderator variables on firm 
level of autonomy in CPA, I model the following regression equation: 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡  
+  𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑛 𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡
+  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where i = firms, t = year, χ is a vector of 𝑛 time-variant controls, 𝛼𝑖 is fixed effects of 
firm, and 𝛾𝑡 is a vector of year indicators. Including firm and year fixed effects allows me 
to further control for time invariant firm-level effects and time trends. In the following 
chapter, I discuss how aspects of the data and available econometric tools influenced my 
testing of the model.  
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL TESTING AND RESULTS 
I test my statistical model on a panel of 21,329 firm years, composed of 2,779 
firms observed over ten years. My unit of analysis is the firm year. Because I study 
autonomy of CPA, I observe only firm years in which the firm engaged in CPA, and take 
great care to ensure that missing data is not a problem. I evaluate several methods of 
statistical estimation, taking into account the atypical distribution of the dependent 
variable, issues of identification, and robustness of specification before selecting fixed 
effects linear regression with clustered standard errors. Counter to my predictions in 
Hypothesis 1, I find a significant positive effect of equity alliance experience, and no 
significant effect of non-alliance experience. For Hypothesis 2 I find support for state, but 
not national, political resources. The analysis reveals that CCPA (Hypothesis 3) does not 
affect autonomy on its own, but has a significant effect when interacted with learning 
capacity (Hypothesis 4). For Hypothesis 5 I find a significant positive effect when prior 
CCPA is interacted with regulatory complexity as quantity or regulators, but find no 
effect for the interaction of CCPA and scope of regulation. 
In the following section, I describe the process by which I tested my hypotheses 
on the P&C insurance dataset. I start by detailing my analysis and resolution of potential 
missing data issues. Next, I provide a brief analysis of descriptive statistics, before 
explaining how I selected a statistical model to interpret. I provide a summary of the 
results of my hypothesis testing and describe robustness checks I applied. Finally, I 
discuss the results and address limitations of this study. Table 3 provides a summary of 
the findings regarding Hypotheses 1-5 from Chapter III.  
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TABLE 3  
Summary of Results 
Hypothesis 
Operational 
Variable Significance 
Direction 
of Effect 
H1: The greater a firm’s market-based alliance 
experience, the less autonomous will be its overall 
CPA. 
Non-Equity 
Alliance 
Experience p = 0.30 N/A 
Equity Alliance 
Experience p = 0.01 
Opposite 
Predicted 
H2: The greater a firm’s political resources, the more 
autonomous will be its overall CPA. 
National 
Political 
Resources p = 0.27 N/A 
State Political 
Resources p = 0.05 
As 
Predicted 
H3: The greater a firm’s prior experience with CPCA, 
the more autonomous will be its overall CPA. 
Prior CCPA  
(Lagged 3 years) 
 
Conditioned N/A 
H4: Learning capacity will positively moderate the 
relationship between prior experience with CCPA and 
autonomy of CPA. 
Prior CCPA x 
Learning 
Capacity p = 0.04 
As 
Predicted 
H5: Regulatory complexity will positively moderate 
the relationship between prior experience with CCPA 
and autonomy of CPA. 
Prior CCPA x 
Complexity  
(# of Regulators) p = 0.01 
As 
Predicted 
Prior CCPA x 
Complexity 
(Scope) p = 0.08 
Opposite 
Predicted 
 
5.1 PANEL SUMMARY AND MISSING DATA ANALYSIS 
The data panel describes data for years 2005 through 2014. The unit of analysis is the 
firm-year, with a firm identifier as the cross-sectional (panel) variable, and year time 
variable. The panel consists of N = 21,329 firm-years of 2,779 firms. Not all company 
cross-sections include data for all 10 years, resulting in an unbalanced panel. The main 
limiting factor in my panel is my dependent variable, as I can only apply my statistical 
model to observations with values of the dependent variable.  
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The unbalanced nature of my data panel necessitates careful evaluation of potential 
missing data and possible introduction of bias. Data can be missing from the data set for 
several reasons including attrition, entry, theoretical exclusion (undefined value of DV), 
or failure of the data set to record a true value of a variable. Both attrition and entry result 
in monotonic missing data (Little & Rubin, 2014). In the case of attrition, firms may have 
exited the sample prior to 2014 because they merged or ceased operation, resulting in 
right-tail monotonic missing-ness. On the other hand, newly formed firms may have 
entered the sample after 2005, resulting in left-tail monotonic missing-ness. Table 4 lists 
the number of firms that entered or exited the panel and the total number of firms 
observed by year. 
TABLE 4 
Attrition and Entry of Firms from/to Sample 
Year 
Firms in Panel 
(CPA) 
(-) Exits 
(CPA) 
(+) Enter 
(CPA) 
Firms in Panel 
(Autonomy) 
Firms w/ 
Gaps 
(-) Exits 
(Autonomy) 
(+) Enter 
(Autonomy) 
2005 2751  2743 2062 348  2062 
2006 2774 71 94 2105 308 44 184 
2007 2816 39 82 2168 316 42 128 
2008 2834 34 54 2216 316 40 101 
2009 2822 66 51 2204 313 90 80 
2010 2782 74 36 2174 295 78 59 
2011 2762 65 45 2169 312 87 51 
2012 2731 66 37 2126 311 106 49 
2013 2693 71 32 2070 306 126 38 
2014 2663 51 22 2035 327 131 27 
Total 3,205 2659  2,779  2035  
Firms with Gap:   9    476 
Total Firms w/o Gap:  3,196    2,779 
Exits before 2014:  537    744 
Enter after 2005:  453    717 
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Non-monotonically missing data presents as gaps in the panel cross-section, with 
valid data present in both an earlier and a later year. These gaps are of most concern if 
true values of the variables exist but are unobservable, for various reasons that can 
include measurement error. The other cause of data gaps is theoretical exclusion, where 
there no true value of the variable exists. Theoretical exclusion is responsible for at least 
some of the missing data in this panel. Because my dependent variable is a calculated 
ratio, it is undefined for observations where the denominator is zero. Recall that the 
denominator of my dependent variable is Total CPA; if a firm does not make any CPA 
expenditures in a given year, autonomy is undefined and will result in a gap in the firm’s 
data cross-section. In the latter case, the missing data is generally ignored. In the former, 
non-random missing data can bias the results.  
To determine the cause of the gaps in the dataset, I coded an additional variable 
(CPA) as a dummy indicator of whether a firm made any investment in CPA (either 
collective or private) in the observation year. Table 5 shows the analysis of missing data, 
listing the number of observations in the sample by their tenure in the panel. Column 1 
lists the number of firms, and column 2 lists the number of firms with no missing values 
of CPA between their first and last year in the panel.  
Out of the 27,628 firm year observations that comprise my sample frame, 61 were 
missing values for the CPA dummy (less than 0.2%). To verify that this data is missing 
completely at random (MCAR), I coded a gap indicator and regressed it on the 
explanatory, moderating and control variables of my main model using probit regression. 
The likelihood ratio of the probit was not significant, F (chi2, 24) = 121.45, p=.25, failing 
to reject the hypothesis (H0) that the data were missing at random. I dropped the 61 firm 
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years from the panel, ensuring that gaps in the dependent variable arose from theoretical 
exclusion rather than incomplete data.  
TABLE 5 
Firm/Year Observations by Year 
Years 
in Panel 
CPA 
# of Obs 
CPA 
w/o Gap 
Autonomy 
# of Obs 
Autonomy 
w/o Gap 
Autonomy 
w/ Gap 
10 22870 22870 13,100 13,100 0 
9 1044 1026 2,502 1197 1305 
8 992 976 1,608 976 632 
7 665 658 1,358 889 469 
6 618 612 780 570 210 
5 515 505 660 465 195 
4 416 412 544 388 156 
3 219 219 369 246 123 
2 178 178 266 204 62 
1 111 111 142 142 0 
Total  
Firm Years 27,628 27,567 21,329 18,178 3,152 
 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 6 provides summary descriptive statistics for the dependent, explanatory, & 
control variables. For each variable, the table includes the mean, the standard deviation, 
the minimum and maximum values, and the variable inflation factor (VIFs). I 
transformed variables as described in Chapter 4 to account for non-linearity in their 
theoretical distribution and improve the linearity of the model; the transformations are 
noted in the table as superscript following the variable name. All variables, except the 
DV, are scaled by a factor of 1/10.  
 The mean value of Autonomy of CPA for firm/years in the sample is 0.37. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, I measure Autonomy as the proportion of PCPA to Total CPA. A 
mean of 0.37 tells us that on average, firms in my sample spent 37% of their total CPA 
expenditures on PCPA. The remaining 63% represents spending on CCPA. 
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Alliance Experience is a relatively rare organizational attribute among firms in 
my sample. Ninety-nine percent of firms in my sample had no recorded Non-Equity 
Alliance Experience in at least one firm/year in the panel, resulting in a Non-Equity 
Alliance Experience of zero in 95% (20,345) of firm/years. Similarly, only 126 firms in 
my sample had non-zero equity-based alliance experience in at least one firm/year, 
resulting in non-zero Equity Alliance Experience in only 1.79% (505) of firm/years. 
TABLE 6 
 Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean SD Min Max VIF 
Autonomy of CPA 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.00  
Non-Equity Alliance Experiencea 0.06 0.33 0.00 4.54 1.01 
Equity Alliance Experiencea 0.03 0.19 0.00 3.22 1.10 
Nat'l Political Resources 0.01 0.12 0.00 2.00 1.01 
State Political Resources 0.16 0.45 0.00 4.00 1.03 
Prior CCPA Experiencec 0.05 0.28 0.00 11.17 46.40 
Senate Committeeb 0.31 0.35 0.00 1.10 1.02 
House Committeea 13.22 20.25 0.00 100.00 1.04 
Firm Agee 41.97 41.05 -1.00 262.00 1.25 
Corporate Group 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.36 
Learning Capacity 0.02 0.07 0.00 1.56 6.33 
Market Share 0.04 0.19 0.00 4.29 4.71 
Regulatory Complexity (# of 
Regulators)a 2.06 1.35 0.00 4.03 1.48 
Regulatory Complexity (Scope)a 5.78 5.31 0.00 30.00 1.59 
Slack 154.84 253.64 0.00 999.90 1.09 
Prior CCPA x Complexity 
(Regulators)d 0.00 1.09 -0.17 43.97 49.69 
Prior CCPA x Complexity (Scope)d 0.00 0.74 -0.12 25.60 7.87 
Prior CCPA x Payrolld 0.00 0.31 -0.02 16.20 7.33 
All variables except Autonomy of CPA scaled by 1/10 
a logged, b squared, c lagged, d 2nd variable mean centered, e negative firm age reflects firms that filed an 
annual statement the year before the commenced business (began issuing policies) 
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Unsurprisingly, both alliance experience variables display heavily right-skewed 
distributions. Among the limited number of firms in my sample that employed strategic 
alliances, the largest number of alliances experienced (in a prior 5-year window) were 93 
non-equity alliances and 24 equity-based alliances.  
The political resource variables are also heavily right-skewed. Twenty-one 
thousand fifty-two firm/years have National Political Resources and 18,458 firm/years 
have State Political Resources equal to zero. Unlike the alliance variables, the political 
resource variables have a much narrower range of observed values. The maximum 
number of officers and directors of a single company who held state political office is 
four, and this number in just in 16 firm/years. Only two companies, in a common 
corporate group, had more than one director and/or officer who served in United States 
Congress.  
The 3-year lagged measure of CCPA ranged from zero (4,921 observations) to 
$111.69 million, but 95% of the data were under $1.7 million. Fifty percent of firm/years 
had lagged CCPA of less than $425,700. With such heavily skewed data, the median is a 
better indicator of central tendency than the mean (with a reported average lagged CCPA 
of $4.85 million).  
A staggering 21% of firm/years incurred no payroll. Possible explanations for 
firms with no employees include inactive firms and small firms that outsource all their 
functions, either to a corporate affiliate or to professional management companies. 
Slightly more than 50% of the observations with zero payroll are of firm members of a 
corporate group, compared to the 66.13% of all observations in the panel of firms that 
belong to a corporate group. 
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The Regulatory Complexity variables are the least heavily right-skewed of the 
explanatory variables. Regulatory complexity as number of regulators is bi-modally 
distributed, with firms cluster around one (7,587 firm/years) and 51 (1,316 firm years), 
with 51 state licenses held just barely edging out 2 (1,302) as the second–most frequent 
value. The two modes correspond with the concept of the classic single-state and multi-
state insurers. Specialty insurers make up the majority of my sample; 50% of 
observations are of firms that sell four or fewer lines of insurance, with 6,987 firms 
offering only one or two lines.  
Table 7 provides the correlations between variables used in the model. Despite 
being mean centered, the interactions of Prior CCPA with Regulatory Complexity 
(States), Regulatory Complexity (Lines) and Payroll are highly correlated with their 
underlying terms and each other. Analysis of the variable inflation factors (VIFs) listed in 
Table 6 reveals a similar pattern. High collinearity among interaction terms is 
mathematically expected. I mean-center the interactions to reduce the VIFs associated 
with the interactions and their underlying terms (Kennedy, 2008). The primary 
consequence of multicollinearity is lower statistical power that results in reduced p-vales 
and overall model fit (R2) as the shared variance is drawn into the error term. Since none 
of the non-interaction explanatory variables demonstrate high correlations or VIFs, 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem outside the expected interactions.  
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TABLE 7 
Correlations for Explanatory, Control, and Interaction Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
1) Non-Equity Alliance Experience 1.00                 
2) Equity Alliance Experiencea -0.01 1.00                
3) Nat'l Political Experiencea -0.02 0.03 1.00               
4) State Political Experience 0.01 0.03 0.06 1.00              
5) Prior CCPA Experiencec 0.00 0.22 0.01 0.01 1.00             
6) Senate Committeeb 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 1.00            
7) House Committeea 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.09 1.00           
8) Firm Age 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.03 1.00          
9) Corporate Group 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.05 1.00         
10) Learning Capacity 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.81 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.14 1.00        
11) Market Share 0.03 0.23 0.00 0.03 0.75 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.88 1.00       
12) Regulatory Complexity (States)a 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.32 0.23 0.29 1.00      
13) Regulatory Complexity (Lines)a 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.39 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.34 1.00     
14) Slack -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.19 1.00    
15) Prior CCPA x Complexity (States)d 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.09 0.80 0.74 0.25 0.23 -0.05 1.00   
16) Prior CCPA x Complexity (Lines)d 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.90 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.09 0.80 0.74 0.21 0.34 -0.06 0.91 1.00  
17) Prior CCPA x Learning Capacityd -0.01 0.17 0.00 -0.01 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.70 0.64 0.94 0.09 -0.02 0.90 0.75 1.00 
 a logged, b squared, c lagged, d centered 
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5.3 METHOD OF STATISTICAL ESTIMATION 
 To choose the correct statistical model to estimate my theoretical model, I 
considered several factors and weighed the strengths and weaknesses of multiple models. 
To avoid mis-specifying the model, I consider potential issues arising from the atypical 
distribution of the dependent variable, identification and endogeneity, and adherence of 
my data to critical assumptions that underlay the models. In the following section, I 
provide a brief review of the possible estimation methods I evaluated, and explain why I 
choose to use and interpret the fixed effects general least squares (GLS) regression 
model.  
Distribution of the Dependent Variable 
Autonomy of CPA is a limited dependent variable. As a proportion, it is 
theoretically bounded between zero and one. The distribution of proportional data 
presents challenges as it does not conform strictly to either a linear or a fully non-linear 
distribution. Figure 3 provides a graph of the density distribution of Autonomy of CPA. 
The graph shows that most of the observations combined collective and private CPA, but 
that large portions of the data fall at the extremes of the Autonomy proportion. Sixty-six 
percent of the time, firms combined collective and private approaches to CPA. The other 
34% of the time firms are either fully collective (Autonomy = 0) or fully Private 
(Autonomy = 1). Firms are fully collective in 4,334 firm years (20.33% of the panel). 
Firms are fully autonomous in 2,912 firm/years (13.67% of the panel). For the remaining 
66% of observations, CPA Autonomy falls between zero and one (14,083 firm years). 
Excluding values at the extreme bounds, the distribution of Autonomy of CPA is roughly 
continuous. 
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FIGURE 3 
Distribution of the Dependent Variable: Autonomy of CPA 
 
Econometricians categorize limited dependent variables are either censored or 
truncated. Data is truncated if observations where a variable exceeds a defined boundary 
are excluded from the sample. Data is censored if defined boundaries are imposed on 
observations and naturally occurring values that exceed the limits are replaced by the 
boundary value (Long, 1997). An example of censored data in this dataset was the QL 
Ratio measure of available slack. The function defined by the ratio formula diverges, but 
A.M. Best imposes a maximum value of 999.90, thus censoring the larger values of firms 
with an extremely large amount of highly liquid resources. 
 Although CPA Autonomy is technically neither censored nor truncated, it has a 
similar atypical distribution with values loaded at the outer bounds of the value. Like 
truncation, my sample includes only observations where the value of CPA Autonomy 
naturally occurs within the limits and results in a restricted sample of the population of all 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the Dependent Variable Autonomy
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firm years. Unlike truncation, however, the restriction occurs because CPA Autonomy is 
mathematically undefined for some observation, as discussed previously in the section on 
missing data. Unlike censored data, the formula for CPA Autonomy naturally converges 
on one as the numerator and denominator increase toward infinity. On the other hand, 
CPA Autonomy evidences the non-continuous jumps in data density at boundary limits 
that characterize both truncation and censoring. The discontinuity jumps make linear 
estimation of the variable problematic.  
Linear regression of a non-linear dependent variable is inefficient when the 
limitations on the variable distribution cause biased and inconsistent estimators of the 
slope and intercepts. Non-linearity of the dependent variable violates the assumptions that 
underlie the Gauss-Markov theorem and interpretation of regression parameters (Greene, 
2003). The preferred solution to limited dependent variables is the tobit model (Long, 
1997). 
The tobit model applies maximum likelihood (ML) rather than least squares (LS) 
to estimate parameters of the regression equation, and can provide consistent results in 
the presence of censoring (Greene, 2004a). Unfortunately, fixed firm effects are 
potentially biased in MLE due to the incidental parameter problem (Neyman & Scott, 
1948), although the bias is understudied in tobit models (Greene, 2004b). In addition, ML 
estimators are inconsistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity and non-normal errors.  
Identification and Causal Inference 
 Endogeneity, as used in causal inference, can mean many things. Broadly, it 
means that a relationship in observed data can be explained multiple ways (Hamilton & 
Nickerson, 2003; Simcoe, 2014). Sources of endogeneity are the general ways a person 
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could argue in favor of an explanation of the relationship different from the explanation 
presented. These alternate arguments can be described as arising from one or more 
general classes of issues including omitted variable bias, simultaneity, self-selection 
(Sorensen, 2012), and reverse causation (Simcoe, 2014). In order to claim a causal 
relationship between my explanatory and dependent variables, I attempt to prevent 
alternate explanations by eliminating the conditions on which critics could draw alternate 
explanations. 
Self-selection is a special case of omitted variable bias, where the omitted 
variable reflects that, in selecting a firm’s attributes and strategies (which become 
measurable variables), firm managers select levels of these variables based on what they 
expect to generate the greatest benefit. In making these decisions, managers most likely 
have access to a more complete understanding of the firm than can be observed from data 
collected. Simultaneity is a special case of reverse causation where we anticipate that 
both a causal and reverse causal effect are at play. I base my identification strategy for 
dealing with omitted variable bias on the use of firm fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity between firms and its potential to bias my results. My 
identification strategy with respect to reverse causation is primarily theory development 
and careful articulation of logically consistent causal mechanisms.  
Endogeneity problems arise in studies of archival data because they lack the level 
of control offered by randomized study designs. Observational researchers cannot ensure 
that firm strategies are not driven by systemic heterogeneity between firms, which in turn 
shapes the characteristics we use as controls. This study is not prospective in that I could 
not observe the autonomy of a firm’s political actions prior to firms selecting those 
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actions. I attempt to control for the initial conditions using fixed effects in panel data to 
control for within-firm variation in the strategic choices make about combining 
approaches to CPA over time. 
I apply Rubin’s Causal Model (RCM) (Rubin, 1990) of observational studies in 
order to approximate the ideal control offered by random trials. Following the RCM, I 
focus on theoretical evaluation of potential outcomes (rather than just observed 
outcomes) and careful analysis of the assignment mechanism by which firms select their 
strategies. This dissertation specifically addresses how firms assign themselves to a level 
of CPA Autonomy by selecting modes of participation in political actions (the strategic 
choice), rather than how those choices influence performance outcomes.  
 Fixed effects estimation is appropriate when unobserved heterogeneity between 
firms affects the dependent variable and correlates with explanatory variables included in 
model. These correlated omitted variables may bias parameter estimates and cause 
researchers to incorrectly interpret the direction and/or magnitude of an explanatory 
variable’s effect. To explore whether my data contains meaningful panel effects that 
would generate omitted variable bias, I model both a fixed effects and random effects 
GLS regression. A Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) comparing random and 
fixed effects GLS models generated a significant test statistic (ch2, 25) = 248.87 (p = 
0.00). A significant Hausman statistic contradicts the null hypothesis (H0) that the 
random effects estimator is consistent, confirming that a fixed effects model is preferred. 
Violations of Key Assumptions 
 Because the dataset includes observations across ten years, the data are likely 
serial correlated. The Wooldridge Test (Woolridge, 2002) for autocorrelation in panel 
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data provides conclusive evidence of serial autocorrelation; the significant F-statistic F(1, 
2436) = 388.5 supports rejecting the null hypothesis that firms are uncorrelated across 
years (H0: 𝜎𝛾
2 = 0). Autocorrelation presents a problem because it violates the 
independence assumption underlying many regression models. Autocorrelation of a 
macro panel with a substantially greater cross-section (I = 2,779) than number of 
observed years (T = 10) is not too concerning, and corrections can be made in the 
regression model. Ultimately, I correct for serial correlation by employing clustered 
standard errors that mitigate serial correlation of form AR(1).  
 Heteroscedasticity is present in a model when the estimated model systematically 
predicts some data more accurately than it does other data, resulting in non-constant 
variance of the error term. A modified Wald test of the fixed effects linear regression 
model F(1, 2779) is significant at p = 0.00, leading me to reject the null hypothesis that 
the variance of the error term is constant across observation and conclude that my data is 
heteroscedastic in linear regression. Under conditions of heteroscedasticity, least squares 
regression models are inefficient but still consistent. The clustered standard errors that 
correct for serial correlation also correct for conditions of heteroscedasticity. Graphs of 
the predicted and residual values that provide visual confirmation of the 
heteroscedasticity are included as Appendix C.  
Heteroscedasticity is model dependent, as it reflects systematic difference in the 
way the estimated model corresponds to the observed values. The presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the linear model suggests that heteroscedasticity is likely also 
present in tobit, but to be certain I perform a random-effects GLS regression and 
investigate the distribution of the errors. As of the date of this study, Stata does not have 
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a pre-packaged or user-written program available to test for heteroscedasticity in panel 
tobit; instead I compare the graphs of the dependent variable plotted on predicted and 
residual values to the comparable graphs of the fixed effects GLS regression found in 
Appendix C. The similarity of the graphs supports the presence of heteroscedasticity, 
under which conditions tobit is both biased and inconsistent. Although not quantitatively 
confirmed, the non-constant errors lead me to eliminate tobit as a viable model, 
especially when taking into consideration the inability to correct for omitted variable bias 
with fixed effects.  
Before concluding in favor of fixed effects GLS, I explore a relatively new non-
linear model designed specifically for similarly distributed dependent variables. I test a 
non-linear form of the model using two-sided censored regression (Alan, Honore, Hu & 
Leth-Petersen, 2011). The two-side censored regression uses the moment condition from 
re-censored and/or re-truncated residuals to construct a uniquely minimized objective 
function. In lieu of MLE, which fits the model by matching distribution of the data, two-
sided censored regression reconstructs residuals that fit the assumptions about the error 
term and relies on OLS and least absolute deviation (LAD) to fit the model. The primary 
appeal of two-sided censored regression is that it allows me to include firm fixed effects 
while correcting for censoring and avoiding the potential bias of MLE.  
The results of the two-sided censored regression are very similar to those of the 
fixed effects GLS regression. Because of this similarity, and drawbacks of the two-sided 
censored regression model, I conclude fixed effects GLS is the best model use to estimate 
my theoretical model. The main drawbacks of the two-sided regression are that it does 
not generate an estimate of the constant, uses only 2,637 of the company-identifying 
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grouping units, and has no existing post estimation programs available. Given the 
similarity of the results, I view it primarily as a robustness check to verify that potential 
inconsistency of my linear model does not substantially affect my coefficient estimates. I 
include the result of the two-sided censored regression in the last column of Table 7 for 
readers who are interested in the newer model. 
Table 7 provides results of the fixed effects estimation of my regression model 
run on the full panel of data. Column 1 introduces the control variables. Columns 2 
through 6 introduce the explanatory and moderator variables I use to test the hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter III. Column 7 presents the model with all variables. Column 8 
provides the results of the two-sided censored regression model. 
5.4 RESULTS 
Hypothesis Testing 
In the following section, I summarize the results of hypothesis testing conducted 
using the results on the fixed effects GLS model. I present the results in the order the 
hypotheses are numbered. Statistical significance tests the likelihood that, on hypothetical 
resampling from the same population, I would estimate an effect at least as extreme as the 
effect I currently estimate. Technically, I do not need to observe statistical significance in 
order to interpret my coefficients since my sample constitutes the full population and 
would not change if resampled. (Schwab, Starbuck, Bergh & Ketchen, 2009). On the 
other hand, the technique I adopt to correct for serial autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity modifies the standard errors rather than the point estimates of my 
regression coefficients. Thus, I observe statistical significance as a conservative approach 
to recognizing potential bias of my estimates. 
 111 
 
TABLE 7 
Fixed Effects Regression of Predictors on Autonomy of CPA 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Non-Equity  
Alliance 
Experience 
H1 
(-) 
 
 
-0.035 
(0.068) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.035 
(0.068) 
-0.085 
(0.106) 
Equity  
Alliance 
Experience 
H1 
(-) 
 
 
0.288* 
(0.129) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.307** 
(0.130) 
0.426** 
(0.170) 
National 
Political Experience 
H2 
(+) 
 
 
 
 
0.157 
(0.248) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.155 
(0.253) 
0.090 
(0.314) 
State  
Political Experience 
H2 
(+) 
 
 
 
 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.023* 
(0.013) 
Prior CCPA 
Experience 
H3 
(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.240 
(0.166) 
-0.096 
(0.230) 
-0.736 
(0.610) 
-0.802 
(0.590) 
-0.656 
(0.734) 
Prior CCPA x 
Learning Capacity 
H4 
(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.417* 
(2.560) 
 
 
5.414* 
(3.100) 
5.465* 
(3.520) 
Prior CCPA x 
Complexity 
(Regulators) 
H5 
(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.887** 
(0.328) 
0.775** 
(0.323) 
0.756* 
(0.391) 
Prior CCPA x 
Complexity (Scope) 
H5 
(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.506 
(0.394) 
-0.563 
(0.386) 
-0.555 
(0.519) 
Learning Capacity 
 -2.166 
(1.658) 
-2.144 
(1.709) 
-2.208 
(1.663) 
-2.409 
(1.629) 
-3.280* 
(1.623) 
-2.312 
(1.620) 
-3.176 
(1.684) 
-3.304 
(1.968) 
Regulatory 
Complexity (States) 
 -0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.023 
(0.016) 
Regulatory 
Complexity (Lines) 
 -0.055*** 
(0.012) 
-0.056*** 
(0.012) 
-0.056*** 
(0.012) 
-0.055*** 
(0.012) 
-0.055*** 
(0.012) 
-0.054*** 
(0.012) 
-0.054*** 
(0.012) 
-0.113*** 
(0.023) 
Market Share 
 -0.060 
(0.051) 
-0.057 
(0.052) 
-0.059 
(0.051) 
-0.063 
(0.051) 
-0.078 
(0.052) 
-0.067 
(0.052) 
-0.077 
(0.052) 
-0.084 
(0.059) 
Senate Committee 
 0.110 
(0.077) 
0.112 
(0.077) 
0.110 
(0.077) 
0.110 
(0.077) 
0.106 
(0.077) 
0.110 
(0.077) 
0.109 
(0.077) 
0.155 
(0.125) 
House Committee 
 -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Firm Age 
 -0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.061*** 
(0.005) 
Corporate Group 
 -0.023 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
-0.024 
(0.017) 
-0.031 
(0.027) 
Slack 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 
 0.610*** 
(0.072) 
0.610*** 
(0.072) 
0.608*** 
(0.072) 
0.610*** 
(0.072) 
0.611*** 
(0.072) 
0.612*** 
(0.072) 
0.611*** 
(0.072) 
 
 
Observations   21329  21329  21329  21329  21329  21329  21329  21329 
R2  0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 Because my hypotheses are directional in nature, I use one-tailed tests of 
significance. Unless otherwise stated, p-values reported are from the fixed effects linear 
regression model that contains all predictors, as shown in column 7 of Table 7. Lastly, I 
provide a brief summary highlighting the significant findings and interpreting their 
marginal effects. As previously presented, Table 5 provides a summary of the results.  
Direct Effect of Alliance Experience on Autonomy of CPA. Hypothesis 1 states 
that, the greater a firm’s market-based alliance experience, the less autonomous will be 
its CPA. This predicts a negative coefficient of the alliance experience variables in the 
estimated model. The results do not support the hypothesized effect.  
As shown in columns 1 and 7 of Table 7, the coefficient of Non-Equity Alliance 
Experience is non-significant (p = 0.30), providing insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that greater alliance experience increases or does not affect the autonomy of 
the firm’s CPA. In contrast, the coefficient of Equity Alliance Experience is significant 
but positive, providing insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that greater 
alliance experience increases or does not affect the autonomy of the firm’s CPA. The 
significant coefficient would actually provide enough support to reject (p = 0.01) the 
opposite (not stated) null hypothesis that greater equity alliance experience reduces or 
does not affect autonomy of CPA. The model suggests that, on average, a 10% increase 
in the number of equity alliances in which a firm invested in the last five years will 
increase the level of autonomy of the firm’s CPA by 0.004. The effect is small, even 
given that I measure autonomy on a fractional scale between zero and one. 
Direct Effect of Existing Political Resources. Hypothesis 2 states that the greater 
a firm’s political resources, the more autonomous its political actions. This predicts a 
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positive coefficient of political resources in my estimated model. As shown in columns 2 
and 7 of table 7, the coefficient of National Political Resources in non-significant (p = 
0.27), failing to provide sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that existing 
political resources increase or do not affect autonomy of CPA. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of State Political Resources is positive and significant (p = 0.05), providing 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that political resources decrease or have 
no effect on autonomy of a firms’ political actions. On average, having one more director 
or officer who has held state political office will increase autonomy by 0.001, again a 
very small magnitude of effect. Interestingly, the non-significant estimate of the effect of 
National Political Resources would be ten times greater than the effect of State Political 
Resources. 
Main Effect of Prior Experience Collective Corporate Activity (CCPA).  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the greater a firm’s prior experience with CPCA, the greater 
will be its autonomy of CPA. When introduced on its own, as shown in column 4 of 
Table 7, the coefficient of Prior CCPA Experience was positive and marginally 
significant (p = 0.07), providing weak support to reject the null hypothesis that Prior 
CCPA decreases or has no effect on autonomy of CPA. On introducing the interaction 
terms (columns 5, 6, & 7), the direct effect of Prior CCPA becomes negative (p = 0.09), 
demonstrating that the support for Hypothesis 3 is conditioned by the interaction terms. 
After accounting for interaction effects, the main effect of Prior CCPA is negative; on 
average an additional $100,000 invested three years prior in CCPA decreases autonomy 
of CPA by 0.0008. The magnitude of the main effect of Prior CCPA is extremely small, 
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but researchers must always evaluate conditional main effects in the context of their 
related moderator variables. 
Moderating Effect of Firm Learning Capacity on the Relationship between 
Prior CCPA and Autonomy of CPA. Hypothesis 4 states that firm learning capacity will 
positively moderate the relationship between prior experience with CCPA and autonomy 
of political action. This predicts a positive coefficient of the interaction term in my 
estimated model. The coefficient of the interaction is positive and significant (p = 0.02) 
when it is the only interaction included in the model (column 5 of Table 7). The 
coefficient remains positive and significant (p = 0.04) when other interaction terms are 
introduced (column 7), inflating the standard errors due to the high collinearity among the 
interactions. These results provide sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that 
the interaction reduces or does not affect autonomy of CPA. The positive significant 
interaction absorbs the positive effect of the main effect, indicating that when learning 
capacity and prior CCPA are both high, autonomy is increased.  
Moderating Effect of Regulatory Complexity on the Relationship between Prior 
CCPA and Autonomy of CPA. Hypothesis 5 states that regulatory complexity will 
positively moderate the relationship between prior experience with CCPA and autonomy 
of political actions. This predicts a positive coefficient of the regulatory complexity 
interaction terms. The coefficient of the interaction of CCPA with Regulatory 
Complexity is marginally significant (p =.08) and negative, in opposition to the proposed 
effect, providing insufficient support to reject the null hypothesis that the interaction 
decreases or has no effect on autonomy. On the other hand, the significant coefficient of 
the interaction of Prior CCPA and Regulatory Complexity as number of regulators (p = 
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.01) is positive and in the direction predicted in all models, refuting the null hypothesis 
that the interaction reduces or has no effect on autonomy of CPA, and supporting 
Hypothesis 5. 
Because the interaction variables are de-meaned interactions of one logged and 
one conventional variable, full interpretation is difficult. As with Hypothesis 4, I interpret 
that when quantity of regulators and prior CCPA are both large, autonomy of CPA 
increases. However, when prior CCPA and scope of regulation are both large, autonomy 
of CPA decreases. 
In summary, hypothesis testing provides full support for Hypothesis 4, partial 
support for Hypotheses 2 and 5, no support for Hypothesis 1, and fully conditioned 
support for Hypothesis 3. The data support Hypothesis 2 for the effect of state-level 
political resources, but not national-level political resources. The data support Hypothesis 
5 for regulatory complexity as quantity of regulators, but not as scope of regulation, 
where the direction of the effect was opposite what I predicted. Despite disconfirming 
Hypothesis 1, the estimated model finds a small but significant effect of alliance-based 
equity experience, but no effect of non-equity alliance experience.  
Robustness Testing 
I evaluate the robustness of my results in several ways. First, I tested the 
robustness of the model to inclusion of additional controls including percentage of 
foreign ownership, regulatory standing, and collective ideology associated with the 
organizational form. None of the alternate controls were significant or significantly 
improved the model. Second, based on findings by Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2014) 
that firms alter their CPA in advance of mergers, I reran the regression excluding all 
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observations of firms that exited the sample before 2014. Restricting the panel did not 
change the results. Next, I tested the model substituting Firm Size measured as total 
written premium (the measure equivalent to sales in the insurance industry) for Market 
Share. The substitution did not affect the results sufficiently to change the direction or 
significance of any of the estimated effects presented above. I tested the robustness of my 
findings to time-invariant differences in the stringency of regulation between domiciles 
by testing a model including indicators for State of domicile. Adding fixed effects of 
domicile did not change the direction or magnitude of any significant effects. 
5.5 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
Discussion of Results 
 As detailed above, regression analysis supported some but not all of the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. In the following section, I will discuss the results by 
drawing on the theory behind the hypotheses. I will address both significant and non-
significant results, and in the latter case, theorize why results were not as expected. I 
organize the discussion by hypothesis numbers. 
 Hypothesis 1. The lack of a negative relationship between alliance experience and 
autonomy of CPA suggests that a firm’s experience in the market may not translate to 
supporting related non-market activities. In Hypothesis 1, I theorized that the knowledge 
and routines associated with managing collaboration in alliances would make firms better 
at, and more likely to, engage in proportionally more collective political actions. Several 
plausible reasons may explain why the data failed to support my theory. First, alliances in 
the market may be a fundamentally different organizational function than collective 
action in politics and may require unrelated managerial competencies. Second, the 
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theoretical connection may be true, but the firms are missing out on opportunities to 
leverage market competencies to shape non-market activities. Baron (1999) argues that 
management scholars have insufficiently integrated their strategy with regard to market 
and non-market environments. This dissertation tests the strategic choice involved in 
CPA, not effectiveness of those choices; its results cannot provide guidance on whether 
firms can achieve greater non-market effectiveness by leveraging alliance capabilities to 
support collaboration in non-market arenas.  
 The significant positive effect of Equity Alliance Experience on CPA Autonomy 
is particularly worth discussing. To make sense of the result, I reviewed the nature of the 
partnerships that comprise the equity alliances in the dataset. A large portion of these 
alliance investments are in insurance-related alliances and joint ventures, which suggests 
interesting implications to agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The positive 
relationship suggests that equity alliance experience may provide not just collaborative 
know-how, but align the interests of alliance partners through common governance. 
Aligning interests through ownership may reduce the need to collaborate on non-market 
issues; the aligned interests ensure that each firm’s political actions will support the other 
firm’s interests. Put another way, firms may be defining their common interest (Olson, 
1965) in small clusters of groups by forming systems of interlocking ownership. By 
deploying this mechanism, firms may circumvent the collective action problem by first 
defining their interests narrowly enough to produce meaningful social incentives. Further, 
their independent actions may constitute action in pursuit of this narrower collective 
interest, much as described by Olson’s (1965) privileged groups. 
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Hypothesis 2. My analysis support Hypothesis 2 for state-level political 
resources, but not national-level political resources. Regulation can occur at multiple 
levels, and different types of political resources may be better suited for supporting 
political action at different levels. The nexus of regulation for the United States insurance 
industry is primarily the state; the support of Hypothesis 2 for state but not national 
political resources may reflect that state-level political resources are more appropriate for 
addressing state regulation. The analysis finds that increased state-level political 
resources increases the autonomy of CPA. When a firm possesses valuable political 
resources of their own, they can engage more directly with their political environment, 
and choose a proportionally larger amount of PCPA. National political resources likely 
did not significantly affect autonomy of CPA in my estimated model because they did not 
match the level at which most insurers engage with their political environment. They 
might also have not been significant because too few firms possess them, causing too 
little variance in the explanatory variable to support statistical significance.  
Careful alignment of measures of political resources with the levels at which 
regulatory institutions exert control and at which firms attempt to exert influence may be 
important in future studies of political resources. Firms may invest in political resources 
at the level of regulation and use these resources to attempt influence at other levels as a 
form of domain defense (Baysinger, 1984). 
Hypothesis 3. The conditioned support of a positive main effect of prior CCPA is 
consistent with my theory. Although on overall average, prior investments in CCPA 
increases autonomy of CPA, firms with greater learning capacity and for whom 
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regulation is highly salient because they respond to a large number of regulators 
experience most of the effect.  
Hypothesis 4. The support of Hypothesis 4 provides evidence of the moderating 
influence of learning capability on the relationship between prior CCPA and autonomy of 
CPA. The results suggest that although CCPA can provide firms access to appropriable 
resources and the opportunity to internalize them to support PCPA, not all firms may be 
equally able to appropriate them. Firms with fewer human resources may not have 
sufficient attention or learning capacity to encode the resources effectively within the 
firm in a meaningful way that actually makes them useful, but under conditions of 
sufficient learning capacity, appropriation is likely to occur. 
Hypothesis 5. Similarly, the support of Hypothesis 5 for regulatory complexity as 
number of regulators indicates that although CCPA provides access to appropriable 
resources, firms may have varying levels of motivation to try to internalize them. When 
more regulators govern firms, the greater complexity may make managing their 
regulatory environment more salient, directing attention to potential opportunities the 
firm has to pursue private action. A greater interest in PCPA can redirect the firm’s 
priorities and encourage firms to create internal repositories of political knowledge and 
resources they develop through CCPA.  
Regulatory complexity increases both the burden of compliance and the 
opportunities for influence. The negative significant effect of regulatory complexity as 
scope of regulation (as measured by the number on lines an insurer is authorized to offer) 
runs opposite predictions. This opposite effect suggests that complexity that manifests 
primarily as increased compliance does not motivate firms to use CCPA as source of 
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organizational learning. In the context of my sample, an increase in the number of rates 
and forms a firm must file with regulators, which primarily increases the firm’s burden of 
compliance, actually reduced firms’ tendency to leverage their prior investments in 
CCPA toward increased autonomy.  
Limitations 
 As does any empirical study of management strategy, this dissertation has 
limitations. In the following section, I discuss these main limitations. I identify and 
describe each limitation, before offering suggestions on how future research may seek to 
overcome it. 
 The most obvious limitation of my dissertation is that the empirical setting 
imposes boundary conditions to the generalizability of my findings. In order to generalize 
my findings outside the U.S. insurance industry, I must be careful to identify how 
differences in other industries and in the regulatory environments of other countries could 
eliminate or reduce my causal mechanisms. One such difference may be in levels of 
regulation between industries and institutions. In particular, regulatory complexity may 
not be a meaningful construct in less regulated industries, and/or when regulations apply 
equally to all firms. If regulation is of low salience, or provides fewer opportunities to 
engage with regulators, firms may have less incentive and opportunity to influence and/or 
capture their regulatory environment. The U.S. insurance industry exhibits both price and 
entry regulation. Future research should explore whether the findings of this dissertation 
are replicable in other industries that exhibit price and entry regulation. 
A potentially major boundary condition is an institution’s political ideologies with 
respect to collaboration. Corporatist and collectivist political systems hold widely 
 121 
 
different expectations as to the nature and timing of collaboration and compromise in 
setting public policy (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). These expectations will shape the degree of 
access firms have to both private and collective political approaches. Future research may 
explore these boundary conditions by testing the theoretical model in other industries and 
in other political systems. If researchers can identify sources of data that provide 
sufficient information consistently across industries and political institutions, they can 
test the model across institutions and industries.  
The methods used in my dissertation limit its ability to identify fully the causal 
relationships at work in determining autonomy of CPA. Future research using quasi-
experimental or dynamic modeling techniques may be able to identify more precisely the 
circumstances under which firms engage in active learning through CCPA in order to 
pursue additional PCPA in the future.  
Another limitation of this dissertation is my inability to measure political 
capabilities directly. At best, I am able to infer capabilities based on the presence of 
certain resources or from observations of a firm’s prior experience. However, the 
capabilities literature shows that not all firms that engage in specific activities or that 
possess similar resources build capabilities around them. As research on strategic 
alliances demonstrates, scholars may need to adopt survey methods that use multi-item 
scales to uncover the capabilities that exist within firms.  
As is widely acknowledged in the CPA literature, the nature of specific policy 
issues may drive firms’ choice of political actions. Although my model intrinsically 
controls for the relevance of issues across industries and institutions, issues may be more 
or less salient to firms within the industry, and I am unable to observe the issues toward 
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which firms take specific political action. When firm heterogeneity of issue salience is 
constant over time, my model controls for issue effects through firm fixed effects. 
However, if firm heterogeneity of issue salience is time-variant I cannot control for its 
effect. I argue that both firms and issue are important levels of analysis of CPA. 
Hopefully, by increasing understanding of heterogeneity among firms of capabilities that 
support CPA autonomy, my dissertation can inform firm-specific controls to include in 
future studies performed at the issue level of analysis.  
My analysis observes differences in regulatory complexity but does not control 
for differences in the intensity or stringency of regulation imposed by different states of 
domicile. Although my results were robust to alternate specification including fixed 
effects of domicile, the intensity and/or stringency of regulation imposed by any given 
state may also vary across time. My analysis relies on an assumption that significance 
effect of intensity found in prior work is primarily a function the interindustry context in 
which researchers conducted those studies. I also assume that the stringency of laws and 
regulations governing insurance do not vary meaningfully between states because the 
NAIC has actively pursue regulatory uniformity through creation of uniform standards 
and model laws and regulations. Future research should evaluate these assumptions by 
exploring if differences in the intensity and stringency of regulators effects the autonomy 
of CPA.  
A final limitation of my dissertation is the ability of my proxies to represent the 
full effect of their related constructs. In particular, my operationalization of national 
political resources as officers or members of the board who served in United States 
Congress may not fully capture the sources of national political resources available to 
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firms. The current model may not adequately identify the causal relationship between 
political resources and autonomy of CPA. The relationship is most susceptible to claims 
of reverse causality and self-selection; firms that employ greater autonomy of CPA may 
purposely recruit directors and officers with political connections to give them greater 
political credibility and to facilitate more direct PCPA.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND MOTIVATION 
This dissertation investigates how a firm’s alliance experience, political resources 
and prior collective CPA affect the autonomy of its CPA. It explores the strategic choice 
firms make when deciding whether to combine private and collective approaches to 
political action, and when selecting a level of autonomy with which to pursue CPA. 
A very broad literature exists on CPA, but little theory or empirical research 
addresses how and why firms choose between or combine collective and private 
approaches to CPA. This gap is despite the collective/private action choice being 
identified as a key stage in the corporate political strategy decision making process 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Early theory treated CCPA and PCPA as substitutes for each 
other, but recent empirical work has shown them to be compliments (Jia, 2014). Of the 
three prior empirical studies that model choice of PCPA and CCPA, two emphasize 
industry concentration, finding that Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action explains 
some but not all of when firms choose CCPA. I build on the foundation laid by the work 
of De Figueiredo and Tiller (2001), Ozer and Lee (2009), and Jia (2014) to develop and 
test theory on how political resources and political and market-based experience 
influence the autonomy of a firm’s overall CPA. 
The influence firms seek over public policy is coming under increasing scrutiny, 
but beyond the implicit assumption that firms act collectively to pursue public goods and 
privately to pursue private benefit, we know very little about why firms engage in CCPA 
versus PCPA. Understanding what motivates collaboration and private action in political 
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activity gives us a clearer perspective on whether firms view regulation as a constraint or 
a source of opportunity. Investigating autonomy of CPA is important because it can help 
us understand the evolving roles of industry’s collective voice and private influence in 
the changing political/business interface.  
6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation contributes to the CPA literature by developing the construct of 
autonomy of CPA. The articulation of autonomy as a continuum bounded by purely 
private and purely collective political actions gives researchers a lens through which to 
evaluate collective action relative to private action and vice versa. Although combined 
measures of CCPA and PCPA are not new (e.g., De Figueiredo & Tiller, 2001; Ozer & 
Lee, 2009), my autonomy construct is theory driven and mathematically sound. 
This dissertation also contributes to the growing literature connecting market and 
non-market strategies by linking collaboration in the political arena to the related market 
activity of alliance experience. Surprisingly, this study finds that collaboration is not 
synergistic across the market/nonmarket divide, and suggests future research to uncover 
if this lack of relationship is missed opportunity or an indication that market and 
nonmarket spheres do not integrate well.  
A third contribution of this dissertation is to unpack the effect of prior learning 
from collective experience. This study finds experience within a collective provides 
opportunities for learning, but that taking advantage of this opportunity depends on a 
firm’s learning capacity, and the complexity of its regulatory environment. This finding 
adds insight to the literatures on inter-organizational learning, collective action and trade 
associations. 
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6.3 THEORETICAL MODEL & HYPOTHESES 
 I test the following five hypotheses that predict how alliance experience, political 
resources, and learning through prior CCPA affect the autonomy of a firm’s CPA: 
H1: The greater a firm’s market-based alliance experience, the less 
autonomous will be its overall CPA. 
 
H2: The greater a firm’s political resources, the more autonomous will be 
its overall CPA. 
 
H3: The greater a firm’s prior experience with CPCA, the more 
autonomous will be its overall CPA. 
 
H4: Learning Capacity will positively moderate the relationship between 
prior experience with CCPA and autonomy of CPA. 
 
H5: Regulatory complexity will positively moderate the relationship 
between prior experience with CCPA and autonomy of CPA. 
 
Figure 4 shows the hypothesized and estimated effects of the model. 
Figure 4 
Theoretical Model and Results 
 
Learning 
Capacity 
Market-Based 
Alliance Experience 
Political 
Resources 
Prior Collective 
CPA Experience 
PCPA 
Capabilities 
Regulatory 
Complexity 
Autonomy of 
CPA 
H2: (+) 
Result: (+) for State,  
p = 0.05 
ns for National 
H3: (+) 
Result: Conditioned by Interactions 
H5: (+) 
Result: (+) for # of Regulators, p=0.01 
(-) for Scope of Regulation, p=0.08 
 
H4: (+) 
Result: (+) p=0.04 
H1: (-) 
Result: (+) for Equity Alliances, p = 0.01 
(-) but ns for Non-Equity Alliances, p = 0.30 
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6.4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 I used fixed effects GLS regression with clustered standard errors to test my 
statistical model on a panel of 21,329 firm/year observations of 2,779 US property 
casualty insurance companies over the ten-year period between 2005 and 2014. My 
findings support H2 for state-level political resources. Support for H3 is conditioned fully 
by the interactions. I find support for H4 and for H5 for regulatory complexity as quantity 
of regulators. Although my analysis did not support H1, I found a significant positive 
affect of equity-based alliance experience on autonomy. Similarly, my analysis found a 
significant but opposite predicted (negative) effect of the interaction of prior CCPA and 
regulatory complexity in the form of increased scope of regulation. 
6.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
 My results suggest the following implications for theory. First, the evidence that 
firms do not integrate strategies of collaboration across the market/nonmarket divide has 
implications for integrated strategy, and prompts future research to evaluate if the lack of 
connection is a neglected opportunity or if the nature of collaboration is just too different 
in the different domains. Second, although the relationship is moderated, firms use trade 
associations as a means of developing firm-specific political resources and capabilities. 
This finding has potential implications for inter-organizational learning and theory on 
institutional fields. Third, the support of H2 for state political resources but not national 
political resources indicates the importance of matching political resources to the level of 
the firm’s primary regulatory interface and prompts future research to consider what we 
can learn about firms that invest in resources at a different level. Lastly, this dissertation 
provides a step toward future research exploring whether different levels of autonomy 
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have performance implications, whether there is an optimal level of autonomy, whether 
maintaining flexibility to pursue both collective and private action pays off, or whether 
firms are better off focusing their efforts through a single approach. 
6.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The findings suggest the following implications for practice. First, trade 
association resources are vulnerable to appropriation. However, it is unclear if the long-
term effect is detrimental to the association or not. Additional research should explore 
whether firms that replicate association resources reduce collective spending, or if they 
just increase the number of political action. Second, the finding backs up prior work (Jia, 
2014) that shows that collective and private approaches to CPA are complements rather 
than substitutes, but managers should understand that we do not yet know if different 
levels of autonomy lead to improved performance. 
6.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
The main implication for policy is that firms are taking multi-mode approaches to 
CPA. The question remains whether this constitutes a shift from a more collective 
approach to a more independent/competitive approach. The mixed effects of regulatory 
complexity provides an interesting second implication for policy; it suggests that firms 
view greater scope of regulatory complexity as constraining, but view increases in the 
number of regulators as an opportunity. 
In summary, this dissertation affirms the importance of prior market and political 
experience in shaping how firms carry out their political strategy. I hope future scholars 
conduct additional research in this area.  
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APPENDIX A 
 DATA CONVERSION SHEET 
TABLE A1 
Company Basic Demographic File Conversion 
P(year)000.csv 
Data Type & Length Line Description & Number 
2008-14 len 2007 len 2005-06 Len Line 2008-2014 2007 2005-2006 
NUM  5 NUM 5 NUM  5 CoCode 1 1 1 
ALPHA 36 ALPHA 36 ALPHA 36 Co_Nm_Shrt 2 2 2 
ALPHA 244 ALPHA 244   Co_Nm_Full 3 3  
NUM  5 NUM 5   Surviving_CoCode 4 4  
ALPHA 1 ALPHA 1 ALPHA 1 Bus_Type 5 5 3 
ALPHA 100 ALPHA 75 ALPHA 75 Bus_Type_Desc 6 6 4 
ALPHA 2     Bus_S_Type 7   
ALPHA 100     Bus_S_Type_Desc 8   
ALPHA 1 ALPHA 1 ALPHA 1 Filing_Type 9 7 5 
ALPHA 10 ALPHA 10 ALPHA 10 Filing_Type_Desc 10 8 6 
ALPHA 2 ALPHA 2 ALPHA 2 Co_Type 11 9 7 
ALPHA 50 ALPHA 35 ALPHA 35 Co_Type_Desc 12 10 8 
ALPHA 2     Co_S_Type 13   
ALPHA 50     Co_S_Type_Desc 14   
ALPHA 11 ALPHA 11 ALPHA 11 FEIN 15 11 9 
ALPHA 2 ALPHA 2 ALPHA 2 ST_Domicile 16 12 10 
    ALPHA 50 Address   11 
    ALPHA 40 City   12 
    ALPHA 2 State   13 
    ALPHA 10 Zip   14 
    ALPHA 30 Contact_First   15 
    ALPHA 30 Contact_Middle   16 
    ALPHA 30 Contact_Last   17 
    ALPHA 20 Phone   18 
    ALPHA 30 Officer1_First   19 
    ALPHA 30 Officer1_Middle   20 
    ALPHA 30 Officer1_Last   21 
    ALPHA 30 Officer1_Suffix   22 
    ALPHA 50 Officer1_Title   23 
    ALPHA 30 Officer2_First   24 
    ALPHA 30 Officer2_Middle   25 
    ALPHA 30 Officer2_Last   26 
    ALPHA 30 Officer2_Suffix   27 
    ALPHA 50 Officer2_Title   28 
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Company Basic Demographic File Conversion continued 
P(year)000.csv 
Data Type & Length Line Description & Number 
ALPHA 11 ALPHA 11 ALPHA 11 Comm_Bus_Date 17 13 29 
NUM 5 NUM 5 NUM  5 Group_Code 18 14 30 
ALPHA 50 ALPHA 50 ALPHA 50 Group_Name 19 15 31 
NUM 5 NUM 5   Group_Code_PY 20 16  
ALPHA 50 ALPHA 50   Group_Name_PY 21 17  
ALPHA 1 ALPHA 1 ALPHA 1 Status 22 18 32 
ALPHA 50 ALPHA 50 ALPHA 50 Status_Desc 23 19 33 
ALPHA 50 ALPHA 25 ALPHA 25 Country 24 20 34 
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TABLE A2 
Directors & Officers Individual Data Conversion 
Data Line Numbers 
Year Fileno CoCode First Midde Last Suffix Title Description 
2014 P2014001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2013 P2013001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2012 P2012001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2011 P2011001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2010 P2010001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2009 P2009001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2008 P2008001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2007 P2007001 1 2 3 4 5 6 NA 
2006 P2006000 1 19/24 20/25 21/26 22/27 23/28 NA 
2005 P2005000 1 19/24 20/25 21/26 22/27 23/28 NA 
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TABLE A3 
Balance Sheet - Assets Data Conversion 
Data Line Numbers 
Year File_Ext 
Total 
NoPC 
Total 
(w/PC) Line_No 
Assts 
CY 
Net 
Admtd 
CY 
Net 
Admtd 
PY 
2014 P006 26 28 2 3 5 6 
2013 P006 26 28 2 3 5 6 
2012 P006 26 28 2 3 5 6 
2011 P006 26 28 2 3 5 6 
2010 P006 26 28 2 3 5 6 
2009 P006 24 26 2 3 5 6 
2008 P004 24 26 2 3 5 6 
2007 P004 24 26 2 3 5 6 
2006 P001 24 26 2 3 5 6 
2005 P001 24 26 2 3 5 6 
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TABLE A4 
Balance Sheet - Liabilities Data Conversion 
Data Line Locations 
Year 
File 
Exten
. 
Liab 
No 
PC 
Liab 
Line 
Unassigne
d Surplus 
Surplus 
as 
Regards 
Pol.hldrs 
Line_N
o 
Curren
t Year 
Prior 
Year 
2014 P008 26 28 35 37 2 3 4 
2013 P008 26 28 35 37 2 3 4 
2012 P008 26 28 35 37 2 3 4 
2011 P008 26 28 35 37 2 3 4 
2010 P008 26 28 35 37 2 3 4 
2009 P008 24 26 33 35 2 3 4 
2008 P006 24 26 33 35 2 3 4 
2007 P006 24 26 33 35 2 3 4 
2006 P003 24 26 33 35 2 2 4 
2005 P003 24 26 33 35 2 2 4 
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TABLE A5 
Income Statement Data Conversion 
Data Line and Column Locators 
Year 
File 
Exten. Line_No 
Net 
Income Current_Yr Prior_Yr 
2014 P010 2 20 3 4 
2013 P010 2 20 3 4 
2012 P010 2 20 3 4 
2011 P010 2 20 3 4 
2010 P010 2 20 3 4 
2009 P010 2 20 3 4 
2008 P008 2 20 3 4 
2007 P008 2 20 3 4 
2006 P005 2 20 3 4 
2005 P005 2 20 3 4 
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TABLE A6 
Lines of Business Data Conversion 
Line Descriptions and Locations 
Line Description 2005-2007 2008 2009-2014 
Fire    1 1 1 
Allied Lines   2 2 2 
Farmowners multiple peril  3 3 3 
Homeowners muiltiple peril  4 4 4 
Commercial multiple peril  5 5 5 
Mortgage Guaranty  6 6 6 
Ocean Marine   8 8 8 
Inland Marine   9 9 9 
Financial Guaranty  10 10 10 
Medical Professional liability -occurrence 11.1 11.1 11.1 
Medical Professional liability - claims made 11.2 11.2 11.2 
Earthquake   12 12 12 
Group accident and health  13 13 13 
credit accident & health (group and individual) 14 14 14 
Other accident & Health  15 15 15 
Workers' Compensation  16 16 16 
Other Liability - occurrence  17.1 17.1 17.1 
Other Liability - claims made  17.2 17.2 17.2 
Excess Workers Comp  . . 17.3 
Products Liability - Occurrence  18.1 18.1 18.1 
Produicts Liability - Claims Made 18.2 18.2 18.2 
Private Passenger Auto liability  19.1,19.2 19.1, 19.2 19.1,19.2 
Commerical Auto Liability  19.3,19.4 19.3,19.4 19.3,19.4 
Auto Physical Damage  21 21 21 
Aircraft   22 22 22 
Fidelity   23 23 23 
Surety   24 24 24 
Burglary & Theft  26 26 26 
Boiler & Machinery  27 27 27 
Credit    28 28 28 
International   29 29 29 
Warranty   . 30 30 
Reinsurance - Nonproportional Assumed Property 30 31 31 
Reinsurance - Nonproportional Assumed Liability 31 32 32 
Reinsurance – Nonprop.tional Assumed Fin. Lines 32 33 33 
Aggregate Write-in for other lines 33 34 34 
Total       34 35 35 
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TABLE A7 
Lines of Business  
Data Conversion 
File Identifiers 
Line of Business File Numbers 
Year File Ext Total  
2014 P018 Line 35 
2013 P018 Line 35 
2012 P018 Line 35 
2011 P018 Line 35 
2010 P018 Line 35 
2009 P018 Line 35 
2008 P016 Line 35 
2007 P016 Line 34 
2006 P013 Line 34 
2005 P013 Line 34 
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TABLE A8 
State Licenses Data Conversion 
File Identifiers and Summary Data 
Year File No Line_No Status Licensed Total 
2014 P2014261 2 3  59 
2013 P2013236 2 3  59 
2012 236 2 3  59 
2011 232 2 3  59 
2010 227 2 3  59 
2009 227 2 3  59 
2008 224 2 3  59 
2007 227 2  3 59 
2006 224 2  3 59 
2005* 224 2   3 58 
* Excludes No 56 - Northern Marianas   
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TABLE A9 
State Licenses Data Conversion 
State Codes 
ST 
Num   
State 
Abbr State Name  
FIPS 
Code FIPS Classification 
1 AL Alabama   1 State; counties 
2 AK Alaska   2 State; boroughs 
3 AZ Arizona   4 State; counties 
4 AR Arkansas   5 State; counties 
  Baker Island  81 Minor outlying island territory 
5 CA California   6 State; counties 
  Canal Zone *  7 (FIPS 5-1 reserved code) 
6 CO Colorado   8 State; counties 
7 CT Connecticut  9 State; counties 
8 DE Delaware   10 State; counties 
9 DC District of Columbia  11 Federal district[4] 
10 FL Florida   12 State; counties 
 FM Fed. States of Micronesia 64 Freely Associated State 
11 GA Georgia   13 State; counties 
12 HI Hawaii   15 State; counties 
  Howland Island  84 Minor outlying island territory 
13 ID Idaho   16 State; counties 
14 IL Illinois   17 State; counties 
15 IN Indiana   18 State; counties 
16 IA Iowa   19 State; counties 
  Jarvis Island  86 Minor outlying island territory 
  Johnston Atoll  67 Minor outlying island territory 
17 KS Kansas   20 State; counties 
18 KY Kentucky   21 State; counties 
     89 Minor outlying island territory 
19 LA Louisiana   22 State; parishes 
20 ME Maine   23 State; counties 
     68 Freely Associated State 
21 MD Maryland   24 State; counties 
22 MA Massachusetts  25 State; counties 
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State Licenses Data Conversion 
State Codes Continued 
23 MI Michigan   26 State; counties 
     71 Minor outlying island territory 
24 MN Minnesota  27 State; counties 
25 MS Mississippi  28 State; counties 
26 MO Missouri   29 State; counties 
27 MT Montana   30 State; counties 
  Navassa Island  76 Minor outlying island territory 
28 NE Nebraska   31 State; counties 
29 NV Nevada   32 State; counties 
30 NH New Hampshire  33 State; counties 
31 NJ New Jersey  34 State; counties 
32 NM New Mexico  35 State; counties 
33 NY New York  36 State; counties 
34 NC North Carolina  37 State; counties 
35 ND North Dakota  38 State; counties 
36 OH Ohio   39 State; counties 
37 OK Oklahoma  40 State; counties 
38 OR Oregon   41 State; counties 
 PW Palau   70 Freely Associated State 
  Palmyra Atoll  95 Minor outlying island territory 
39 PA Pennsylvania  42 State; counties 
40 RI Rhode Island  44 State; counties 
41 SC South Carolina  45 State; counties 
42 SD South Dakota  46 State; counties 
43 TN Tennessee  47 State; counties 
44 TX Texas   48 State; counties 
  U.S. Minor Islands  74 Minor outlying island territories (aggregated) 
45 UT Utah   49 State; counties 
46 VT Vermont   50 State; counties 
47 VA Virginia   51 State; counties 
  Wake Island  79 Minor outlying island territory 
48 WA Washington  53 State; counties 
49 WV West Virginia  54 State; counties 
50 WI Wisconsin  55 State; counties 
51 WY Wyoming  56 State; counties 
52 AS American Samoa  60 Outlying area under U.S. sovereignty 
  American Samoa *  3 (FIPS 5-1 reserved code) 
53 GU Guam   14 (FIPS 5-1 reserved code) 
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State Licenses Data Conversion 
State Codes Continued 
  Guam*   66 Outlying area under U.S. sovereignty 
54 PR Puerto Rico  72 Outlying area under U.S. sovereignty 
  Puerto Rico *  43  
55 VI U.S. Virgin Islands  78 Outlying area under U.S. sovereignty 
  Virgin Islands of the U.S.*  52 (FIPS 5-1 reserved code) 
56 MP Northern Marianas  69 Outlying area under U.S. sovereignty 
57 CN Canada     
58 OT Aggregate Alien    
59 .S Subtotal         
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TABLE A10 
CPA Data Conversion Sheet 
CPA Line and Column Locations 
Year 
File 
Number CCPA PCPA Legisl. 
Line 
Col. 
Amt 
Ln 
DetNm 
Ln 
DetAmt 
Ln 
2014 P2014065 33 34 35 2 3 4 5 
2013 P2013040 33 34 35 2 3 4 5 
2012 P2012040 33 34 35 2 3 4 5 
2011 P2011040 33 34 35 2 3 4 5 
2010 P2010036 32 33 34 2 4 14 15 
2009 P2009036 31 32 33 2 4 14 15 
2008 P2008034 30* 31* 32* 2 4 14 15 
2007 P2007035 30 31 32 2 4 14 15 
2006 P2006032 28 29 30 2 4 14 15 
2005 P2005032 28 29 30 2 4 14 15 
2004 P2004032 27 28 29 2 4 12 13 
2003 P2003032 25 26 27 2 4 12 13 
2002 P2002033 23 24 25 2 4 12 13 
2001 P2001034 26 27 28 2 4 14 15 
2000 P2000018 40a-b 41a-b 42a-b 2 4 8 9 
*corrected from 12-15: P2008034pdf has error in numbering - checked print blank 
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TABLE A11 
Non-Equity Alliance Data Conversion 
Schedule F Pt 3 Line Identifiers 
Year File Num. Auth Affil 
Mandatory 
Pool Unauth Affil 
2000 P2000041 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2001 P2001055 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2002 P2002054 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2003 P2003053 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2004 P2004052 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2005 P2005052 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2006 P2006052 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2007 P2007055 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2008 P2008044 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2009 P2009047 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2010 P2010047 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2011 P2011051 1,2,3,4 6,15 10,11,12,13 
2012 P2012051 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 10,23,36 14-21, 27-34 
2013 P2013051 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 10,23,36 14-21, 27-34 
2014 P2014076 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 10,23,36 14-21, 27-34 
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TABLE A12 
Slack Conversion Sheet 
Multiple File Line & Column Identifiers 
 
(omitted) 
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TABLE A13 
Equity Alliance Data Conversion 
File Locations 
Yr BA Pt1 
BA Pt2 - 
Acquired 
BA pt3 -
Disposed 
2000 P2000028 P2000029 na 
2001 P2001238 P2001239 na 
2002 P2002238 P2002239 na 
2003 P2003237 P2003238 na 
2004 P2004236 P2004237 na 
2005 P2005237 P2005238 na 
2006 P2006237 P2006238 na 
2007 P2007240 P2007241 na 
2008 P2008251 P2008252 P2008253 
2009 P2009254 P2009255 P2009256 
2010 P2010254 P2010255 P2010256 
2011 P2011260 P2011261 P2011262 
2012 P2012264 P2012265 P2012266 
2013 P2013264 P2013265 P2013266 
2014 P2014373 P2014374 P2014375 
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APPENDIX B 
DATA MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL 
TABLE B1 
Data Management Protocol Part 1 
Data Group Var 
types 
Stage 1 DoFile summary Post Append 
do file 
PA Step 2 summary output file 4 merge: 
CPA 
Variables 
DV, IV CPAv3Append appends files straight from excel(csv) 
and saves as dta 
CCPA Detail 
Coding.dta 
NewCPAAppend
CPAPt2 
Removes extra lines of data (non-
CPA), reformats & addresses 
missing values+Cleans; Adds 3&5 
year lags &drops 2000-2004 
2005-
2014CPA4merge 
Lines 
Offered 
IV Pg8EPWAppend Exhibit (Pg8) from csv, adds variable 
names, and save dta 
LineCtPostAp
pend 
  
 Schedule F 
PostAppend (run 
last) 
Creates Line_Ct Variable & 
Tot_Prem vars 
LineCt4merge.dta 
Premium 
Written 
Mod Premiums4merge 
Payroll Mod Exhibit of 
Expenses Append 
inputs and appends UW expense exhibits PayrollPostAp
pend 
Cleans and reduces to payroll only Payroll4Merge.dta 
State 
Licensed 
IV StatesAppend appends from CSV, adds names 
+corrects 1 error 
StatesPostApp
end 
Reduces to total STCt_Lic SchedTStates4Merge 
Alliance 
Experience 
IV Schedule BA Pt1 uploads each csv, adds variable names, 
and appends Exquity Investment data 
BA Post 
Append 
Version2 (run 
first), creates 
BA4merge2 
  
reduces to Non-Equity Alliance 
Data, then adds in BA4merge2.dta, 
& SDC4mergeCompany.dta, 
calculates 5 year sums; Calcs sums 
for SDC4mergeGroutp. 
Alli4Merge.dta 
Schedule BA 
Pt2&3 
uploads each csv, adds variable names, & 
appends; combines pts 2 & 3 
Schedule F Pt 3 imports and appends reinsurance ceded 
Non-NAIC\ 
SDCCoMatch 
imports and saves excel coded data, 
prepares data for hand coding 
SDCpostWA
M (run 2nd) 
SDC4mergeGroup 
Basic 
Demographi
c 
Control CompanyBasic 
Append 
uploads each csv, adds names & appends CompanyBasi
cPostAppend 
  calculates Age, 
reshapes&condenses 
CompBasic4merge 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Control For_OwnAppend uploads each used csv file, adds names, 
saves as dta, and appends; drops columns 
and lines not related to FO 
For_OwnPost
Append 
  creates detail sheet, then reshapes 
and condenses, contains cleaning 
prompts 
FO4Merge 
Financial 
Statements 
Control FinStatementsApp
end 
uploads csvs and appends assets, 
liabilities, and income statement 
FinStatPostAp
pend 
      
Slack Control SlackAMB inputs and reformats the AMB QL 
Ration data 
QLRUpdate QLAppend uploads csv and generates 
additional slack var 
AMBSlack4merge2 
  
    
1
4
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TABLE B2 
Data Management Protocol Part 2 
Data Group Var 
types 
Stage 1 DoFile summary Post Append do file PA Step 2 summary output file 4 merge: 
Committee 
State Years 
IV Political 
Capabilities Step 1  
inputs data on committee membership 1999-2014, & generates dummy and count variables by state/yr 
"CommStateYrs.dta" , merges FIPS codes into CompBasic and CommStates into CompBasic 
Comm4Merge 
US Congress 
Names 
IV Inputs US Congress, cleans & saves 
DO Names IV DO_2005 standardize & dedup FYI 
file, run DO_2005 first 
OfficersPostAppend3- 
AMB&2008 
   
DO_2006    
DO2_2007-2014 stand. & dedup FYI, creates 
DOIDb  
OfficersPostAppend2007    
DO Name 
replacements 
support file     
DO_2_Idupdates support file     
State 
Politician 
Names 
IV Non-NAIC/ 
StatePolNames 
Output  
preps 1)Klarner state Leg 
db, 2)SM State Leg db, 3) 
merge of the 2. 4)Klarner 
governors database. 
PolResStep2-
changespostWAM… 
  PR24Merge 
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TABLE B3 
Data Management Protocol Part 3 - Merge & Process 
File Names Stage 1 DoFile Stage 2 DoFile Analysis DoFile 
SchedTStates4Merge 
DissDataMerge DissDataPostMerge1New DissDataAnalysis4 
LineCt4merge 
Premiums4merge 
FO4Merge 
2005-2014CPA4mergev3 
Comm4Merge 
Alli4MMerge 
Alli4Merge_Group 
PR24Merge 
Payroll4Merge 
AMBSlack4Merge2 
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APPENDIX C 
HETEROSCEDASTICITY DETAIL 
 
Figures 3 and 4 provide visual confirmation of heteroscedasticity in the model. Figure 3 
shows a plot of the observed values on the predicted values. Figure 4 shows a plot of the 
observed values on the residuals. Both the positive slope and the narrowing of the 
residuals at higher levels of autonomy indicate heteroscedasticity. 
 
FIGURE C1 
FIXED EFFECTS REDICTED AND OBSERVED CPA AUTONOMY 
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Figure 3: FE Predicted and Observed CP  Autonomy
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FIGURE C2 
FIXED EFFECTS RESIDUAL AND OBSERVED VALUES OF AUTONOMY OF 
CPA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
-.
5
0
.5
1
R
e
s
id
u
a
ls
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Autonomy of CPA
Figure 4: Residual and Observed Values of Autonomy of CPA
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